PREVENTING CRIME
The Hilldrop Project
FIRST REPORT

THE HILLDROP CRIME SURVEY
A Project in Preventing Crime
Middlesex Polytechnic
THE HILLDROP ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT SURVEY

FIRST REPORT

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CENTRE FOR CRIMINOLOGY

MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC
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A. BACKGROUND

1. A FOUR STAGE CRIME PREVENTION PROJECT

The Hilldrop Project is a four stage crime prevention programme carried out by the Centre for Criminology in an inner city area. Its first stage involved community consultation, the second a survey of crime problems, the third, the implementation of a series of interventions based on its findings, the last a monitoring of whether the policies have, in fact, worked.

2. HILLDROP AS AN INNER CITY AREA

Hilldrop is an area of London in the North of Islington consisting of both council and residential housing. It has a low average income typical of the inner city.

3. PROJECT BACKED BY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, COUNCIL AND THE POLICE

The project was funded by the Department of the Environment at a cost of £12,950 and commissioned by the Police and Community Safety Committee of Islington Council.

4. A MONITORED PROJECT

The project involves a unique combination of features.

- The policy is developed out of the survey which identifies residents' problems of crime and policy priorities and the basic principles of crime prevention

- The implementation of the crime prevention measures is monitored

- The results of the interventions are measured 12 months after their implementation

Only three previous crime prevention surveys in the U.K. have had one of
these features let alone all three. The project sets itself up against
the all too frequent practice of throwing money at a social problem
without any independent monitoring of results in terms of real gains in
crime prevention.

5. A SPECIALLY DEVISED QUESTIONNAIRE

Since the first British Crime Survey, (1982) the criminal victimization
survey has become an established way of assessing the real incidence of
crime given that only a proportion of crimes are reported to the police.
It has the following special features:

- It covers not only crime, but sexual and racial harassment, heroin use
  and child abuse.

- It asks not only public assessment of policing effectiveness, but also
  of other agencies such as the Council.

- By using high sampling it is able to break down the incidence of
  crime by the combination of age, employment status, gender and race,
  and thus has a high social focussing.

- By using mapping it is able to focus geographically high incidence of
  crime and fear of crime.

6. A MULTI-AGENCY INITIATIVE

- It is a multi-agency project involving initiatives by the council, the
  police and the public on various levels, including education,
  lighting, policing and neighbourhood watch.

- It stresses the interactive nature of each aspect of crime prevention,
  e.g. better lighting aids policing, beat policing aids Neighbourhood
  Watch, etc.
7. HIGH RESPONSE RATE

An extremely high response rate of just over 85% was achieved and 58% of all households were samples. Total number of households surveyed - 57.5%.

B. FINDINGS

1. CRIME AS A PROBLEM

Crime was seen as the second problem in the area just after unemployment: 69% saw crime as a problem compared to 71% who saw unemployment as a problem.

2. FEAR OF CRIME

When asked if they were worried 'quite a bit' or 'a lot' - 52% worried about being burgled, 51% worried about being mugged, 59% of women worried about rape, 52% of women worried about sexual harassment.

Women worried about being mugged considerably more (63%) than did men (34%).

3. AVOIDANCE BEHAVIOUR

35% of all residents often or always avoid going out after dark because of fear of crime.

48% of women avoided going out after dark. The areas in Hilldrop which residents feared are shown in maps in the report.
4. INCIDENCE OF CRIME

Percentage of Households Experiencing Crime in the Last Year:

- Burglary: 7
- Attempted Burglary: 8
- Theft of Vehicle: 5
- Damage to Vehicles: 17
- Mugged: 5
- Physically Attacked: 4

5. CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

Blacks were almost twice as likely to be victims of crimes against the person as white. Women were 60% more likely to be victims than men: young people (under 24) were six times more likely than those over 45.

6. BEAT POLICING

78% thought there were too few foot patrols.

7. DISSATISFACTION with POLICE and COUNCIL AGENCIES

Percentage of the public dissatisfied with treatment when contacting these agencies in the last twelve months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Department</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Office</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. POLICE EFFECTIVENESS

Percentage who believed the police were not successful in tackling various crimes:

- Racist attacks: 41
- Burglary: 59
- Sexual assaults: 46
- Heroin dealing: 36
- Mugging: 59

9. PUBLIC POLICING PRIORITIES: THE PRIORITY CRIMES

Out of 17 offences the following were the crimes prioritized: Sexual Assaults on women, Mugging, Dealing in Heroin, Burglary, Racist Attacks and Drunken Driving.

10. HEROIN

30% see heroin dealing as having increased over the last 5 years. 5% knew someone who has taken heroin regularly, 36% rate the police as unsuccessful in tackling the problem. 63% saw control of heroin as a police priority.

C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

TARGET HARDENING

A massive council introduction of locks on all ground floor windows and strengthening of doors.

LIGHTING

A detailed lighting programme is suggested, including the individual lighting of front door areas and the upgrading of street lighting which is at present 'of such a poor standard it is difficult to take even the lowest of light-reading levels'.
BEAT POLICING

The stepping up of levels of beat policing with the aim of increasing radically levels of public-police cooperation.

SCHOOLS

Anti-crime and harassment courses should be introduced to the curriculum, stressing the moral context of crime.

ANTI-CRIME EXHIBITION

Should be mounted in local schools, libraries, youth clubs, neighbourhood offices, etc. with emphasis upon the impact of crime on victims.

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

The Report advocates setting up of a Neighbourhood Watch scheme based on the council's Neighbourhood Forum, with regular police liaison. Two major functions of the Watch scheme would be collection of information on sexual attacks and harassment of women on the estate and the Watch scheme to be the basis of a Victim Support Scheme.

SHAPING UP TO CRIME

The Report stresses the fact that each priority crime has its own weak spot. It urges the police and other agencies to:

- act against fences in the case of Burglary by organizing a registration of property numbers of videos, TV's, etc. and a vigilant checking of local second-hand shops

- act against low level dealing in the case of Heroin - thus being the most publicly obvious and weakest part of the drug chain

- act to clear up the after dark 'no go areas' for women identified by the report. Here lighting has to be radically changed, beat policing focussed and perhaps decoys used as in other European cities.
SECTION 1
THE HISTORY OF THE PROJECT

The idea of a Hilldrop Environmental Improvement Survey arose from a series of seminars held between the Centre for Criminology at Middlesex Polytechnic and Islington Council offices. The seminars emanated from the Policy Implementation stage of the highly publicised Islington Crime Survey and reflected a general desire amongst both academics and Council Officers to develop a more highly-tuned mechanism of developing data-informed crime prevention initiatives. Although the Islington Crime Survey provided an overview of the Borough, there was a consensus that a highly focussed, localised study, using large samples, would be more productive in developing more specific policy initiatives. Furthermore, it was felt that a study in a smaller geographical area would more readily facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of those initiatives. From its initial conception, monitoring was seen by all as a vital part of the Project. Only three previous independent studies in the UK have had a satisfactory monitoring element, and any study not containing a monitoring component would be clearly inadequate in terms of bridging the gap between data and theory on one hand and the evaluation of the success of policing implementation on the other. (See Hope and Dowds, 1987) All parties involved in the Hilldrop Project were keen to break with "1960's Welfarism" - throwing public money at an identifiable social problem and hoping that some of the money would stick to the target. They were interested in working towards a more coordinated planned approach, where monies, not only reached the social target, but also where public agencies could measure the amount of service delivery and social impact they generated from a specific impact of public funds and resources.

The Hilldrop Environmental Improvement Survey (HEIS), once conceptualised, was taken a stage further by the involvement of the Metropolitan Police. After a series of constructive meetings between the Council and the Police, it was decided to choose a geographical area by both Parties, independently, drawing up a shortlist of three areas within the Holloway Metropolitan Police Divisional boundaries. Two of the areas on each list were identical and both parties agreed to eliminate the one non-matching area on their lists. After further consultation, the Council and the
Police decided that the "wider" Hilldrop area was the most appropriate, for two reasons. Firstly, it was seen as an area with identifiable in the past problems, both for Council agencies and the police. Secondly, both parties saw it as a "typical" inner city area, as opposed to either a gentrified, middle class enclave, or a so-called "sink" inner city Council estate.

"Wider" Hilldrop is an area of 1,235 units of housing on the Islington-Camden borders. Its "natural" boundaries are Camden Road, Brecknock Road, Carleton Road and Dalmeny Road. In terms of its social profile, it is approximately 70% Council housing and 30% private sector housing. Although it is predominantly working class, 8% of the population have a household income of £15,000 a year or more. It has a high proportion of single people and enclaves of elderly people. Hilldrop, although predominantly white, has a similar ethnic mix to most of the Borough, and endures similar social problems. That is, despite its middle class image, Islington appears in the top seven of all deprivation indicators for England and Wales. And the Council's and the police's perception of Hilldrop as a "typical" inner city area has, by and large, been borne out by the data.

By the Autumn of 1986, the various discussions between the Centre for Criminology and Council's officers from the Police Committee Support Unit and consultations with other interested parties, had resolved the final form which the Hilldrop Project should take. This involved four distinct stages:

(a) consultation with local community groups;
(b) the first quantitative Survey of the area;
(c) policy initiatives derived from stages (a) and (b), and a programme of "workers", the implementation of which is carefully monitored;
(d) a final, evaluative Survey after an appropriate period of time.

The Research team also examined the problem of displacement and of a "control" area which is outlined later in this Report.

Underpinning the Project's form are a series of research goals, which can be summarised as follows:
(a) Data informed Policy and/or technical Initiatives

From the beginning the Research team was determined that resultant policy and technical initiatives were not only "in line" with the wishes of people living in the area, but stemmed directly from the data. Although that level of specificity can prove to be elusive in reality, the design of the Survey and the compact geographical nature of the area facilitated an interface between data and policy initiatives, as well as linking all stages of the Project into a coherent whole.

(b) Multi-Agency Cooperation

Since the early 1980's the multi-agency approach to crime prevention has been a key part of the Home Office policy. Although welcome to most as a panacea to escalating crime in the inner cities, it has rarely been an approach coordinated by a worked out, shared theory, and has infrequently been inadequately funded. Often because of this, it has been solely police-centred, which has caused frequent criticism, much of which is wide off the mark and often based on an extravagant notion of the efficacy of the multi-agency approach. For example, the London Strategic Planning Committee's recent 'Community Safety' leaflet informs us:

"enlisting other agencies in supporting the police in dealing with policing problems in the inner city - particularly public order problems involving black youths". (L.S.P.C. 'Community Safety', 8/4/87, p1)

Such naive criticisms are easily rebutted, but the real problems of lack of cohesive goals, adequate funding and the monitoring of results, remain. As we see later in this chapter, our commitment to multi-agency social intervention attempts to address these goals. It should not be thought that the practical coordination of diverse agencies, often with distinct and different objectives and lines of accountability, is far from an easy task. But the Hilldrop Project, from the researchers' points of view, offers a unique opportunity to monitor and evaluate a multi-agency initiative in action, as the Council, the police, and the local community have made a common cause around a tangible initiative.
(c) **The Social Impact of Policy**

Most crime prevention initiatives, whether they involve target hardening, improvements in Council estate and street lighting, social facilities, etc. do not attempt to monitor and evaluate the social impact of their component parts. The Hilldrop Project is unique in that it sets out, not only to evaluate the overall effect of the basket of policy and technical innovations on the area through the final survey, but it also evolves from its Stage 1 and 2 consultations and survey the police's, which are implemented. Policy is, as it were, internal to the project rather than something external to be measured.

(d) **The Effective Use of Social Resources**

As has been indicated, the Research team were keen to break with '1960's Welfarism' and, as a result, one of the Project goals is to evaluate the cost-effectiveness, in terms of social delivery, of the various initiatives arising out of the first survey. We would argue that a major contributory factor to the lack of social impact of many 1960's and early 1970's, a period of relative public expenditure largesse, social policy initiatives was a tendency to throw resources at a problem without evaluating the equation of how much, and what quality of social delivery one achieved from a given amount of public resources. Given the current financial climate, this equation is particularly pertinent to many local authorities, as it is desirable in itself to measure the level of service delivery from public resources.

The initial stage of the Project itself involved a period of local consultations.

**Local Consultations**

We felt that the first stage of the Project should be to consult as many and as diverse as possible, community groups in the area. The rationale behind this was to develop local interest in the Project and to create a flow of qualitative information and local data to inform us in our construction of the questionnaire. The Islington Council is decentralised
into 24 Neighbourhood Offices, each with its own 'Forum! The consultation took the form of attending Neighbourhood Forum meetings at the Council's Neighbourhood office. These meetings were made up of people from the locality - the Council and the police sharing a joint platform. These generated local interest, not to mention a string of complaints against both the Council and the police. In addition we talked to as many local groups as was practicable and possible outside the confines of Forum meetings. This period of consultation took nearly 4 months, but was felt to be worthwhile in terms of thoroughness and achieving its initial purpose. By the end of 1986, a fairly wide range of local groups incorporating Tenants' Associations, Voluntary Sector Groups, and special interest groups, had been consulted.

With the assistance of the Council's neighbourhood officers, a "Steering Committee" was formed from the membership of the "Neighbourhood Forum" and utilising the Neighbourhood office's "local knowledge", it was possible to ensure that it was broadly based so that all local points of view and all social sub-groups in the area were represented. This local Steering Committee was set up for three primary reasons:

(1) to facilitate a flow of information from the Research team back to people living in the area; (2) to assist in the monitoring of the Policy Initiative stage of the Project and to facilitate local input into the various policy options arising from the survey, and (3) to encourage active, local involvement in the Project.

Let us now turn to the extent of the problem which the project faced and the means of achieving it.
3. THE PROBLEM OF CRIME IN THE INNER CITY

Recorded crime in London has risen dramatically over the last twenty years. In the ten-year period 1976 to 1986 alone notifiable crime in the Metropolis has risen by 63% and we know from a series of studies that crime is seen as the second problem for inner city dwellers after unemployment. (R Kinsey, 1985, T Jones et al, 1986, J Lea, et al, 1987). There are clear signs that these public fears about crime in the inner city are realistic. This was the main finding of the survey of the whole of Islington carried out in 1985. And this has clear policy implications. As the authors of the Metropolitan Policy Strategy Plan for 1986 put it:

"The importance of the ICS to police is that it contradicts many existing views on urban crime, the most significant relating to fear of crime. Whilst the BCS showed that people's fear of crime was generally out of proportion to its extent, the ICS has shown that in the inner city this fear is actually realistic and based on personal experience. Thus, whereas the Home Office and this Force were exploring policies aimed at reducing the 'Fear of Crime' the ICS has shown the possible folly of pursuing these in the inner city divisions." (1986, p.97)

In Hilldrop, as we shall see, we have an inner city area with crime rates way above the national average and with a corresponding fear of crime which significantly affects the quality of life of its citizens. The problem is, what can be done to alleviate this problem?

4. A MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH TO CRIME CONTROL

"My strategy continues to reflect the fact that the Force alone cannot provide tidy solutions to the many problems that confront Londoners and impair their quality of life. Indeed, it would be a monstrous deceit for anyone to attempt to sustain such a fiction. The major resources for crime reduction are to be found in the community itself and in other public and voluntary agencies." (Newman, 1986, p.7).

Thus, the former Commissioner of Police, in his 1987 Strategy Statement, detailed his commitment to a multi-agency approach to crime control. Let
us briefly note the reasons for the emergence of such an approach:

4.1 The Existing System of Crime Control

Multi-agency intervention is the planned, coordinated response of the major social agencies to problems of crime and incivilities. The central reason for multi-agency social intervention is that of realism: it corresponds both to the realities of crime and to the realities of social control. Social control in industrial societies is, by its very nature, multi-agency. The problem is that it is not coordinated and represents a series of other disparate policy initiatives, with little overall rationale for the allocation of resources, and institutions which are often at loggerheads with each other.

There is a tendency within the field of adult crime to stress the role of the police, criminal courts, criminal law and the prisons (and similarly within juvenile justice, the social services). To take the role of the police, commentators, of all political persuasions, both of the right and the left, have elevated their crime control function to a paramount position. The involvement of other institutions is played down, resources are allocated in accordance with this belief, and the whole discussion about crime control revolves around the success or failure of beat policing, numbers of police, police technology, etc. in the fight against crime.

David Smith, in his pioneering study of the London police, correctly points to the limited role of the police in the overall system of social control:

"Another example of the limited, yet decisive, role of the police is in the control of disruptive behaviour in schools. The example is particularly interesting because such a high proportion of the incidents that the police deal with concern children and young people. Many fights and scuffles take place in schools, which might in other circumstances be interpreted as minor assaults. There is also a considerable amount of damage to school property (most of it minor damage) and a fair number of thefts. The schools have their own systems of rewards and punishments for trying to prevent this kind of behaviour and dealing with it when it does occur. They also have links with parents through which they try to use the family to reinforce the codes of conduct applied at school. The vast majority of fights, thefts and incidents involving deliberate
damage to property are dealt with by the school procedures and within the family. There is always, implicitly, a threat that a matter may be reported to the police if the offender does not step into line, but in practice the police are informed in a very small proportion of cases (though we do not know what the proportion is). Even when they are informed, they will not take action unless the school or other loser decides to press a charge. Thus, schools and families not only bear the main responsibility for controlling the behaviour of children, but they also largely decide when the police shall be involved and whether or not formal proceedings shall be started.

Examples of this kind show that it is mostly not the police but other agencies and individuals that 'set the agenda' for law enforcement". (1983,p.12)

His example is particularly relevant, as, of course, a very large proportion of what are conventionally defined as crime and incivilities are, in fact, committed by adolescent boys who are both members of schools and of families. Indeed, these are the two social institutions which form the major rubric of their lives. Immediately that such a simple insight is brought to light we are forced to ask how do these institutions coordinate together in terms of crime control? (i.e. police, education and the family). The answer to this question is, of course, that, although social control is de facto multi-agency, there is nowhere near any coherent notion of their coordination let alone a planned distribution of resources.
4.2 The Existing Nature of Crime Control Initiatives

The discourse centring around crime control is replete with reference to police, criminal law and prisons. Even when multi-agency approaches are advocated, as in multi-agency policing, they are in terms which centre around the police as the pivotal organization which coordinates, initiates and sets the agenda for crime control. Yet in fact the initiatives for crime control are largely external to the police. At the most simple level it is the public that inform the police of the existence of crime in 95% of instances (Jones et al., 1986). Further, as Smith points out:

"Although there is some truth in the platitude that 'the police are dependent on the support of the public', the formulation is too simple and does not go far enough. The police are not, for the most part, the prime movers, the initiators of the societal processes that control deviant behaviour; on the contrary, they work, for the most part, at the margins, where the usual processes of control have broken down. Most of the time they are responding to direct requests from individuals or other agencies, and even then they can only act effectively where the assumptions and values that govern their actions are more generally shared. Even within that small proportion of their total activity in which they appear to be taking the initiative, the police act as a continuation and development (by specialists) of more general efforts by the mass of people and institutions to maintain order, control and coherence. In other words, the police are a small but extremely important element within a much larger complex of inter-related systems of control. They require support, though not uncritical support of unthinking obedience; for they themselves are only supporting (not initiating or directing) the wider forms of social control." (1983, p.10)

But, once again, although crime control is multi-agency and predominantly non-police initiated, there is little coordination and principles behind such initiation. At least one half of serious crime is not reported to the police - the so called dark figure of crime (see Hough and Mayhew, 1983; Jones et al., 1986). This dark figure occurs because of various reasons: because the public think the police are ineffective at controlling a particular crime, because they deem them inappropriate agencies, because they fear the police, or because they fear victimization from the criminal itself. There is very little public knowledge of the various agencies which might be thought more
appropriate, largely because of a remarkably low level of public presentation of these agencies. Child abuse, for example, can be reported directly to the social services, anti-social parties to council representatives, truancy to the education welfare officers. And in terms of the family there is an almost complete absence of mediation schemes which would allow, for example, outraged fellow citizens to complain about the neighbours' delinquent children outside of an angry encounter on the doorstep.

In terms of the relationship between the various agencies with each other (e.g. social services with the school) or with the police, there are, in many instances, few guidelines based on a clear delineation of function and of the criteria for cross-referral.

4.3. The Interactive Nature of the Impact of the Various Agencies

The degree of impact of an intervention about crime by one agency is dependent on the other agencies. To take a simple example: no amount of propogation by the police of crime prevention advice in terms of better locks and bolts will be effective on estates if the council does not simultaneously strengthen the doorframes of its tenants' houses. Or, of greater significance, police effectiveness is almost totally predicated on public support - it cannot function without the information flow from the informal system of social control. And the same is true of deterrence: the effect of police cautioning or sentences of the court relates closely to the degree of public stigma.

4.4 Different Agencies are Involved for Different Crimes and at Different Stages in the Process of Tackling Offenders

If we compare burglary to child abuse we see immediately the differences between the involvement of the various agencies. Burglary will, in general, have a high police involvement in terms of the apprehension of the criminal. The local council on the other hand will have the greatest role in the 'target hardening' of the local estate. If the culprit is an adult, social services will be unlikely to be involved, but they will, of course, do so if the offender is a
Juvenile. For child abuse, in contrast the social services will play a major role, the schools will be major institutions of detention, and the medical profession will play an important role in terms of corroboration. And in terms of the different stages of tackling offenders: one can see how the police role as a back-up agency for providing coercive intervention where necessary and legal evidence in the courts occurs at different times in the procedure than the long-term process of social work intervention.

4.5 Different Agencies are Involved at Different Parts of the Trajectory of the Offender

A realist approach to offenders sees the development of criminal behaviour over time. It breaks down this trajectory of offending into its component parts and notes how different agencies can and should be operative at different stages. Thus we can talk of (1) the background causes of crime; (2) the moral context of opting for criminal behaviour; (3) the situation of committing crime; (4) the detection of crime; (5) the rehabilitation of the offender.

Let us examine these one by one, noting the factors involved and the agencies with power to intervene.

4.5.1. Background Causes.

These lie in relative deprivation as witnessed in poverty and unemployment, in overcrowded housing conditions and in inadequately funded families (particularly single parent). Here central government, and the local authorities have responsibility.

4.5.2. The Moral Context

Here we have particularly the family, the education system, the
mass media, youth organizations and religious organizations. Here the public themselves, the councils, in their provision of education and youth facilities, the media professionals in terms of content of the often heavy media, of adolescents, and local religious and youth leaders, have their roles.

4.5.3. The Situation of Commission

Here the target hardening, lighting, public willingness to intervene and police patrols are important. Thus the important agencies are the council, the police and the public themselves.

4.5.4. The Detection of Crime

Here, as discussed above (4.2), the cooperation of police and public is paramount, both in terms of informing the police and witnessing in courts.

4.5.5. The Rehabilitation of the Offender

A rehabilitated offender, of course, should not be a recidivist. Here social services are prominent in their role of caring for young people, but also the possibilities of employment, and the showing up of unstable family situations are all local authority matters.

We have discussed the wide range of tasks which influence crime, which involve different agencies and which are influential at different times in the trajectory of offending. It is important to note how these agencies have different material possibilities of intervening and act within given political limits. We have to choose then what agencies are involved and what factors are feasibly manipulable.
4.6 The Victim is in Need of Multi-Agency Support

Up till now we have discussed the whole process of multi-agency social intervention as if it was just concerned with dealing with offenders and preventing offences. We must never forget, however, the other half of the dyad of crime: the victim. Here again it is obvious that various agencies must be involved in tackling the problem of criminal victimization. Social services, for example, may have to deal with the after effects of a mugging of an elderly person, the council has to repair doors after burglary, battered women's refuges have to deal with domestic violence, the police have to deal with the victims' fears on the spot. Thus our measurement of success - or failure for that matter - is not solely in terms of the levels of offending (i.e. crime), but in the levels of victim support provided.

5. THE NEED FOR MONITORED RESEARCH

Professor Dennis Rosenbaum, the leading international expert on crime prevention, notes in his exhaustive and meticulous examination of community crime prevention programmes:

"Despite all the impressive statistics and laudatory accomplishments attributed to community crime prevention programs, the standard evaluations in this field, which structure the foundation of public opinion about the success of these programs, are seriously wanting...

The endorsement of community crime prevention programs extends from many quarters, including federal, state, and local government agencies, as well as community organizations. The enthusiastic embracing of community crime prevention is perhaps most apparent at the grass-root level, where practitioners acclaim the utility of their efforts through popular press articles and numerous homespun program publications, newsletters, and guidebooks that also serve to assist interested communities in the planning and implementation of programs."

"Not everyone has the same level of interest in presenting the 'hard facts.' To obtain program funding from public or private sources, grant applications often have a strong motivation to convince the funding agency that it will be investing in a proven,
highly effective program for preventing crime in their community. Likewise, the granting agencies, although wanting to remain neutral in the absence of hard data, also want to believe that they were supporting a good 'product'. Moreover, the media are very interested in success stories inasmuch as our losses in the seventeen-year 'war against crime' have greatly outnumbered our victories. Consequently, we have witnessed literally hundreds of media stories about the proven successes of community crime prevention over the past decade. Given this state of affairs, the primary 'checks and balances' must come from the academic community, armed with evaluation research skills and disinterested in the direction of the outcome." (Community Crime Prevention: Does it Work? D Rosenbaum, 1986, pp.19,22,23)

And, of course, Rosenbaum is talking about U.S. research. In Britain the situation is much bleaker - most community crime prevention programmes are simply not monitored, or if they are, are monitored using patently inadequate data and measures of success and failure. In Britain there have been, in fact, only three adequately monitored pieces of research: Trevor Bennett's study of neighbourhood watch in London (1987, Pat Allat's study of the impact of crime prevention measures on burglary (1984), and Hedges et al (1980) study of vandalism and crime. (See Hope and Dowds, 1987). This puts the present Hilldrop initiative in its true perspective: for it not only attempts to monitor the impact of crime prevention, it further sets itself the task of proposing the measures necessary.

Part of this problem of monitoring is the inadequacy of the statistics of crimes known to the police. The police themselves have become acutely aware of this. For example, to take neighbourhood watch as an example, as Sir Kenneth Newman notes in his 1986 Report:

"Neighbourhood watch has merged as the most significant crime prevention measure ever initiated by the Force. The schemes now number nearly 7,000 involving 1.25 million people. Evaluating the effects of neighbourhood watch is a difficult exercise. We can point to particular watches which have led directly to police arrests for burglary; in one, for example, some 21 arrests in one year. Others show significant falls in the levels of reported burglary. The collective impact of all watches is, however, harder to assess although burglaries in London have declined slightly over the past two years compared to rises for the remainder of the country. Ironically, as over 30% of burglaries are not reported (British Crime Survey, 1984), an increased reporting rate could be viewed as an indicator of success in the sense that, because of improved contact with the police, people find it easier to report crime and feel more confident about the usefulness of doing so."
Thus a rise in the rate of burglary in terms of figures known to the police a measure of success. Furthermore, a fall, of course, can be a failure. And the same is even more true of crimes with large dark figures such as rape, racist attacks or domestic violence. How can we obtain tolerably accurate figures in order to evaluate our project?

6. The Use of Victimisation Surveys

The sample survey of criminal victimisation is a well established method for estimating the incidence in populations of crime in which the victims are individuals and/or households. This research technique typically involves asking samples of the general public about crimes which may have been committed against them in some preceding period, such as a year or six months.

The major purpose of victimisation surveys is to gain a more accurate estimate of the true extent of crime than that provided by the official crime statistics compiled by the police which are subject to widely acknowledged problems of accuracy, the most serious of which is the failure of a high proportion of victims to report criminal incidents to the police.
Victimisation surveys have many uses, especially for policy makers and planners concerned with police effectiveness and the impact of crime upon victims, non-victims, and neighbourhoods. The questionnaires on which the surveys are based are designed to yield information, not only about criminal incidents, but also a wide range of factors which may be associated with victimisation. Such information includes the characteristics of victims and (if known), offenders, the time and place of the event, its impact, and the reporting or non-reporting of the event. There is also an intention to relate victimisation to factors such as age, race, gender, place of residence, etc. and to estimate the impact of victimisation upon attitudes and behaviour.

Two of the most important areas addressed by the surveys are:

- the fear of victimisation in relation to the actual extent of crime
- the response of the police, their behaviour towards the victims, and the subsequent attitudes of victims to the police.

6.1 Victimisation Research in Britain

In this country three national surveys have been conducted by the Home Office: The British Crime Surveys of 1982 and 1984, and the Scottish Crime Survey of 1983. However useful these national surveys are, they have the widely recognised limitation of being too wide in their focus to be of use in many areas of policy making. Crime is extremely focussed by locality, and for this reason local surveys are necessary.

The Centre has been to the fore in conducting in local crime and policing surveys; to date we have worked on the following projects:

Merseyside Crime Survey (Home Office funded)
Islington Crime Survey (local government funded)
Broadwater Farm Survey (for the Gifford Inquiry)
North London Neighbourhood Watch Evaluation Survey (local government funded)
We have built up a level of expertise in this area and specialize in selecting large samples to allow breakdown by area, age, gender, race and employment status. Our response rates are some of the highest for inner city work - over 80% in most instances. Part of our task in many of these projects has been intensive consultation within the community, both before and after surveys, to assess peoples' problems in the area and to feed back data to them afterwards.

6.2 Characteristics of the Second Generation Crime Survey

The second generation of victimisation studies which have been developed at the Centre for Criminology attempt to extend the width of previous surveys, utilising a more precise method of analysis and a greater local focus. These surveys cover the traditional scope of victimisation surveys but add new features. The traditional areas covered include:

(a) distribution of crime, fear of crime, precautions taken about crime and impact of crime on victims;

(b) public encounters with the police, public demands on police, response times, public assessment of police attitudes and effectiveness;

(c) the above factors in relation to social structure of the locality.
In addition, the following new areas have been included in the scope of the surveys:

(a) extension of crime questions to include racial and sexual harassment, heroin abuse and other areas of anti-social behaviour;

(b) in the area of policing, building on the work of the Policy Studies Institute, we have included questions on the public's policing priorities with regards to various types of crime, assessment of police officers, experience of and belief about police illegalities, the effectiveness of police complaints system, and opinions as to control and accountability of police forces;

(c) in the area of service delivery it is now recognised that crime prevention policy must be multi-agency in scope. Accordingly the questionnaire has been extended to include problems of service delivery and demands on other agencies besides the police, such as the local council (eg speed of repairs service to council flats that have been broken into, public assessment of which agency should be responsible for various types of crime prevention) and the role of victim support schemes.

(d) We have devised a sampling system that allows sharper focus on the particular problems of small localised areas (eg estates with extremely high levels of racial harassment, or crime rates by ward) while at the same time being able to provide statistics at a borough-wide level.

(e) A new spatial dimension has been added with the use of local maps within the questionnaire to enable the plotting of victimisation incidents, areas avoided due to fear of crime, etc.
6.3 The Uses of Crime Surveys

6.3.1. Social Audit.

By basing their results directly on the experience of the public such surveys allow an estimation of the real level of crime, including the 'dark figure' of crime unreported to the police, a figure particularly high in the categories of crimes of violence and domestic offences. This facilitates the estimation of the real clear up rate for crime and an assessment of police performance in crime control. It can gauge public confidence in the police and in other agencies involved in crime prevention. Such assessments of public opinion can therefore be seen as extending the democratic process and information available for public evaluation of the performance and behaviour of state agencies.

6.3.2. Pinpointing

Planners are enabled to pinpoint the precise locations of particular crime problems such as heroin abuse, sexual assault, burglary in terms of geographical location, and the social groups victimised. This facilitates the rational allocation of resources and provides identifiable targets for local action.

6.3.3. Policy Intervention

Additionally surveys provide an initial estimate of public support for various policy initiatives. Also they facilitate the development of working principles for intervention. For example, the knowledge that the low clear-up rate for crime is essentially a problem of the lack of cooperation between certain groups in the population and the police which, in turn, is a result of alienation of those groups due to perceived police malpractice. This type of knowledge, gained through survey research, greatly extends the scope of rational policy formation.
6.3.4. Data Resources

Such surveys generate a database which is of use, not only as one-off report, but as a resource which can be of continuous use. Most immediately, this is because of the amount of data generated which may be repeatedly referred to, for example, when a particular problem or incident occurs. Of most importance is the basis provided by a survey for the measurement of changes over time, for example as an assessment of the impact of policy innovations. Finally, of course, the data provided, as an extra touch, provides a useful source of general demographic statistics (e.g. of employment rates by social group, or the concentration of single parent families in a particular location).

6.3.5. Summary

The second generation crime surveys developed at the Centre for Criminology widen out from the focus solely on crime and policing, to a range of anti-social behaviour and harassment and problems of multi-agency intervention and service delivery. They allow a focus on local areas geographically and socially and the experiences of particular groups in the community. As a policy resource they provide a social audit for the community, a means of pinpointing the location of social problems, a guide to policy intervention and a database for future comparison.

7. The Islington Crime Survey

In Islington we have the advantage of data from one of the few local surveys that have occurred in Britain. For in 1985 the Islington Crime Survey (ICS), conducted across the Borough Survey of crime and policing. The questions used relate closely to the British Crime Survey and to the Policing Study Institute survey of London police. This enables us to relate Islington figures to data from London or the country as a whole. Most importantly the Hilldrop questionnaire derives from ICS and allows us to make comparisons between Hilldrop and the Borough. Further, the Centre is at present repeating the ICS and thus will allow us comparison points with the second Hilldrop survey.
8. Outline of Research Strategy

The research component of the project falls into three phases:

Stages 1 and 2: to ascertain what crime prevention and community safety initiatives are feasible in the Hilldrop Area, and to make recommendations to the working party.

Stage 3: to monitor the implementation process.

Stage 4: to report on the degree of successful implementation and the effects of the measures.

Stages 1/2

The first stage has to provide, by means of questionnaire survey and consultation two types of information:

(a) what residents are most interested in as far as crime prevention is concerned. There are two problems here. Firstly, survey responses may not constitute a meaningful set of preferences on the basis of which actual support for particular measures can be ascertained. If crime is perceived to be a growing problem in the area then respondents may answer positively to any checklist of measures presented to them, especially if there is little experience of any of them in practice. Secondly, enthusiasm for a particular set of measures may be unrelated to the appropriateness of those measures in dealing with the actual problems of crime and incivilities as encountered in the area. A survey of residents' preferences must therefore be accompanied by the gathering of other types of information.

(b) A close survey of the crime profile of the area. Data collection at this stage must be structured so as to enable us to assess the relevance of particular measures for implementation in stage 3. For example, it is clear that if changes in lighting are to be considered as a possible strategy then, in addition to recording residents' preferences for such changes, we need to map victimisation incidents, areas avoided due to fear of crime, etc.
and see how they relate to the existing structure of lighting. Similarly, an assessment of the relevance of Neighbourhood Watch requires data on peak burglary times in relation to residents' movement patterns (as well as access to telephones and fields of vision), as well as an assessment of the relative importance of burglary as opposed to other types of crime and incivility (e.g. sexual assault, racial attacks, etc).

(c) The social basis for particular measures. Resident's desire for a particular measure and its relevance to the crime profile of the locality must be accompanied by the right social conditions. For example, even if Neighbourhood Watch is desired by a majority of residents and burglary is a significant crime in the area, if we discover a low degree of community integration, and a high level of belief, say, among residents of one ethnic group that most crime is committed by locals of other ethnic groups, then from what we already know from research into Neighbourhood Watch in inner city areas, we must be in a position to draw the working group's attention to some of the likely problems facing such schemes.

The conclusion of Stage 2 will, therefore, be an 'action research' approach in which preferences for particular measures would be matched to data on the area crime profile and an estimate of the feasibility of various measures in relation to social conditions in the area, and then presented to the working group for discussion and final decision on an action plan. The aim to the action plan will be to select those measures which secure a maximum of support, relevance to crime profiles, and social feasibility.

The completion of stages 1 and 2 requires therefore:

(a) survey of residents' support for particular crime prevention measures and evaluation of service delivery from existing council agencies and police with regard to crime prevention;

(b) crime/incivility profile of the area based on victimization data from the survey combined with local breakdown of police statistics for reported crime;
(c) description of the structure of community life in the area as it relates to the feasibility of crime prevention and community safety initiatives;

(d) a properly constituted and structure of communications and discussion representative of all local interests to enable the research team, the Council, the police, and tenants' and residents' representatives to discuss the research findings and arrive at a mutually agreed action plan. The responsibility of the research team lies in the clear and straightforward presentation of survey results. The development of the structure of communications and representation of interests is the responsibility of other parties.

8.2 Stage 3

The main task of the research team during stage 3 will be sitting in and monitoring the implementation process. Particular attention will be paid to the development of relations between implementing agencies and their communications with residents. The research team would make periodic reports to the working group.

8.3 Stage 4

The evaluation of the effectiveness of those measures which are implemented presents us with the greatest methodological difficulties from the standpoint of survey research. The most likely scenario is that a number of measures will be simultaneously implemented. In order to assess the relative contribution of each implemented measure of crime/incivility rate in the area, a sophisticated array of control areas would be necessary. Such as assessment cannot therefore main aim of the Stage 4 research.

The main areas which Stage 4 of the project will be able to investigate and assess will therefore be:

(a) the impact of the overall package of measures on the rate of crime and incivilities and fear of crime in the area;
(b) the interdependence of different crime prevention measures;

(c) the extent to which individual measures have been successfully implemented.

9. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN STRATEGY

As explained, an important component of the stage 2 survey will be an attempt to assess the relevance of a number of crime prevention measures in terms of (a) their level of public support; (b) their relevance to the crime profile for the area; (c) their feasibility in terms of social and community structure in the area. This is elaborated below:

9.1 Neighbourhood Watch

(a) level of support: belief in efficacy, knowledge of functions, attitudes to cooperation with police/other agencies in operation of schemes, belief in beneficial community effects versus worry about dysfunctional effects (spying on neighbours, etc).

(b) crime profile: relative importance of burglary/auto crime in relation to other crime/incivilities (domestic, racial attacks, assault/harassment, drugs, noise, vandalism/graffiti, etc).

(c) social base: knowledge and trust of neighbours, membership/support for community organizations, patterns of movement (number of evenings out, percentage of dwellings occupied at peak crime times), technical factors (access to telephone, etc).

9.2 More Beat Policing/Police Liaison Panel

(a) level of support: desire for more police/perceived role of other agencies in control of incivilities, sections of population most enthusiastic (e.g. house-bound elderly), role envisaged for liaison panel/police surgery;

(b) crime profile: importance of fear of crime, incidence of
(b) **crime profile**: importance of fear of crime, incidence of regular public spaces;

(c) **social base**: degree of consensus regarding policing priorities for areas, evaluation of police behaviour and performance.

9.3 Changes in Lighting

(a) **level of support**: objections to existing lighting, repairs, etc.

(b) **crime profile**: mapping of victimization and incivilities in relation to lighting profile of area, degree of avoidance of dark areas from fear of crime;

(c) **social base**: general movement patterns through the area.

9.4 Target Hardening

(a) **level of support**: housing seen as insecure, insurance problems, proportion of single households, elderly in area, percentage of unattended dwellings at peak crime times;

(b) **crime profile**: incidents of burglary/auto crime;

(c) **social base**: relations with and evaluation of council repairs/maintenance, proportion of elderly in area likely to have difficulty with locks, reinforced doors, etc.

9.5 Youth and Educational Facilities

(a) **level of support**: identification of young people as significant offender group, lack of youth facilities seen as problem;

(b) **crime profile**: youth living in area or nearby school as offenders, types of offences committed by young people (e.g. high level of sexual harassment) as basis for anti-crime education in local schools;
(c) **social base**: numbers of young people in the area at school/unemployed.

### 9.6 Tenants Mediation Scheme/Law Centre

(a) **level of support**: familiarity with and understanding of mediation. Level of calls on police to perform mediator function;

(b) **crime profile**: pattern of crime and incivilities, incidence of neighbour disputes, offences by known individuals, etc.

(c) **social base**: degree of experience of criminal justice system, consensus concerning relative importance of different types of offences in relation of punishment. Absence/presence of stereotypical (e.g. racist) labelling of offender groups.

### 9.7 Facilities for Women

(a) **level of support**: desire for refuges, rape examination en police officers;

(b) **crime profile**: level of fear of crime by women, incidence of sexual assault/harassment/rape/domestic violence;

(c) **social base**: effective women's presence in area reflected in community groups, degree of cross gender consensus on crime against women.

Additionally, the Phase 1 questionnaire will attempt an evaluation of an existing service delivery by the major agencies (police, Neighbourhood Office, Housing and environmental services). It is argued that the best way to handle this is to work out a common frame for all the services:

(a) presence of the agency in relation to need, and respondent's knowledge of the services available;

(b) understanding by the agency of area needs and impartiality of operation between social groups;

(c) frequency of contact with the agency and evaluation of outcome;

(d) prioritisation of agency goals (as related to crime and crime prevention).
SECTION 2. THE SURVEY

2.1. The Hilldrop Community.

2.1.1 Demographic and social composition.

The age structure of the Hilldrop area consists of 26 per cent in the 16-24 age group, 43 per cent in the 25-44 group and 13 per cent 45. Ethnically the community is made up of 81 per cent white, 12 per cent black, 1 per cent asian and 6 per cent other non whites.

Households led by a single adult made up 49 per cent of the sample, 25 per cent of households included one or more children under 16, and 68 per cent of households included at least one person over 16 in full time employment.

Income levels on the estate as reported to the survey were distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under 3,000 pounds</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 to 7,999 pounds</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000 to 11,999 pounds</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000 to 14,999 pounds</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 15,000 pounds</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.2 Community Structure

Just over half the residents of the Hilldrop area (52 per cent) had lived in the area over five years. A further 29 per cent had lived in the area between one and five years and 19 per cent had lived in the area under one year. Hilldrop is therefore a fairly settled community. However those who have lived in the area 'under a year are a significant minority and this may give rise to special needs for information concerning council services, community groups and the existence of the local Neighbourhood Office.

How far does the community function as such? The survey investigated to what extent people knew their neighbours. Over a third (36 per cent) of residents knew most of their neighbours, a further 51 per cent knew most of them and only 13 per cent knew none of their neighbour. Thus 87 per cent of the sample knew a few or most of their neighbours. Other indications of a reasonable degree of neighbourliness in the Hilldrop area were the substantial majorities feeling that noise from neighbours or general unfriendliness were 'not really' problems in the area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>noise from neighbours</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general unfriendliness</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey also asked whether people would ask their neighbours for assistance with simple crime prevention tasks such as keeping an eye on their home while away on holiday. Almost two thirds (63 per cent) would be prepared to ask neighbours to 'keep an eye' on
their homes while they were away. However a significant number (33 per cent) did not feel that they would do this.

2.1.3 Voluntary Associations

How far do people participate in local community organizations and are these organizations representative of the structure of the community as a whole in terms of race gender and age? While 52 per cent of respondents had heard of a tenants association in the area only 9 per cent were members and only 8 per cent were participants (participation being defined as having been to a meeting or any activity during last 2 months. Of those who had heard of it only 29 per cent rated the service it provided for the community as good or very good. These findings may be compared for example with the recent survey of the Lansdowne estate in Lambeth conducted by the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit which found that 42 per cent of those who had heard of the local tenants association rated it as providing a good or a very good service. The Middlesex Polytechnic survey of Broadwater Farm (1986) found that 73 per cent of those who had heard of the tenants association rated it as providing a good or a very good service.

The other major community organization in the area is the Hilldrop Area Community Association (HACA) 49 per cent of residents had hear of it and of these, only 4 per cent been to a meeting or any activity during last 2 months and 24 per cent rated the service it provided for the community as good or very good, a similar proportion as in the case of the tenants association.

Of those who had attended a tenants association meeting during the last 12 months 35 per cent were male and 65 per cent female. participation rates for men and women were similar (7 per cent and 9 per cent respectively). As to participation by race, there were no marked differences between black and white. 8 per cent of whites 9 per cent of blacks were participants. There is no survey evidence therefore pointing to any racial exclusivity by these organizations.

In the case of age participation the bulk of participants in both HACA and the tenants association reported to the survey were in the 25-44 age group (in each case about half the participants.) The proportions of each age group that participated were: 16-24: 2 per cent, 25-44: 10 per cent, 45 and over: 11 per cent. The low participation rate for young people is not in itself a problem if other organizations exist to integrate these age groups into the community. However 'youth hanging around the streets' was mentioned as a bit of a problem or a big problem by 45 per cent of the sample. This may be some indication of the lack of facilities and organizations which link young people into the community. The alienation and marginalisation of young people from organizations both national and local which integrate them both into the local community and the national political process is related to the incidence of crime in this age group.

Additionally 5.3 percent of the sample reported membership of other groups and organizations operating in the area. Respondents were also asked if there were any community organizations that they would like to see established in the area. The only significant responses were a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme, Youth facilities and sports clubs were each mentioned by 3 per cent of
the sample.

2.1.4. Conclusions

It is clear therefore that while participation is not biased in terms of race or gender, age bias may be a problem and steps need to be taken increase the overall numbers participating and to extend the base of the community organizations operating in the Hilldrop area. This is especially important given the role of such bodies in integrating residents into the community and linking them to the council, one of the main agencies in a position to organize and provide resources for crime prevention. The importance of community organizations in this respect is illustrated by the fact that participants were likely to have more knowledge of council provisions and to rate council efforts in the crime prevention area more highly than non-participants. Thus 35 per cent of tenants association (TA) participants had heard of the Council's Neighbourhood Office compared with 22.6 per cent of the general sample, 30 per cent of TA participants rated the council very or fairly successful at crime prevention compared with 19 per cent of the general sample and 54 per cent of TA participants rated the Council's performance in street lighting as very or fairly successful compared with 20.0 per cent of the sample as a whole. This tendency for participants to give more favourable evaluations of Council activities did not extend to council house repairs. Here 22 per cent of TA participants rated the Council as very or fairly successful compared with 25 per cent of the general sample.

2.2. General Problems of the Area

How did crime feature in relation to other issues felt by respondents to be problems in the area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(percentages)</th>
<th>Big Problem</th>
<th>Bit of problem</th>
<th>Not really</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Housing</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The behaviour of the police</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor street Lighting</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor schools</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor public transport</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race relations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Unfriendliness</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough places for children to play</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise and mess from dogs</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise from Neighbours</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth hanging around the streets</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin dealing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual harassment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If problems are ranked by the percentage of respondents who rated them as a 'big problem' or a 'bit of a problem' then the problems identified by half or more of the sample are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unemployment</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noise and mess from dogs</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor housing</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vandalism</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not enough places for children to play</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor street lighting</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those things least regarded as problems, ranked in terms of being seen as 'not really' a problem are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>noise from neighbours</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general unfriendliness</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor public transport</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>race relations</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It might be expected that different sections of the population would have differing perceptions as to the importance of some of these. Hence while there was agreement between men and women on the extent to which crime was a big problem in the area (39 per cent of women and 38 per cent of men), on some of the issues which can be regarded as likely to be indicators of the likelihood of crime for people outside the home, there were differences between men and women. Thus 14 per cent of men and 21 per cent of women thought youth hanging around the streets was a 'big problem' in the area. The 30 per cent of women who thought poor street lighting was a 'big problem' compared to only 18 per cent of men. This reflects the greater problems facing women out after dark. Sexual harassment is seen by 11 per cent of men and 18 per cent of women as a 'bit of a problem' or a 'big problem' in the area.

2.2.2 Fear of Crime and Avoidance Behaviour

Respondents were asked how much they worried about the possibility of particular types of crime occurring against them:
How much do you yourself worry about the possibility of your home being broken into and something stolen?

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>Quite a bit</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your home being broken into and something stolen?</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being mugged and robbed?</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WOMEN ONLY</strong> being raped?</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WOMEN ONLY</strong> being sexually harassed?</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having your home or property damaged?</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by vandals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being attacked by strangers?</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being insulted or bothered by strangers?</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures reveal a high level of worry about crime. 52 per cent of residents worried 'quite a bit' or 'a lot' about burglary and 51 per cent worried similarly about being mugged in the street. Over half women worried about rape (59 per cent) and a similar proportion (52 per cent) worried about sexual harassment. These figures reveal how central crime is as a concern of the residents of Hilldrop.

Again, gender differences were important. While the level of worry about property crime was broadly similar for men and women (45 per cent of men and 54 per cent of women worried 'quite a bit' or 'a lot' about the home being broken into and something stolen), women were disproportionately concerned about personal victimization on the streets. While only 34 per cent of men worried 'quite a bit' or 'a lot' about being mugged and robbed, the proportion for women was 53 per cent.

High levels of fear of crime lead people to take precautions. The survey asked how often people, simply as a precaution against crime, engaged in various types of avoidance behaviour:
Avoidance behaviour derived from fear of crime is a significant element, therefore, of life in the Hilldrop area. Just over a third of residents (35 per cent) often or always avoid going out after dark as a precaution against crime and a similar proportion (31 per cent) stay away from certain streets or areas as a precaution against crime. It is very likely that the practice of staying away from certain streets and areas is related to street lighting. Over two thirds (78 per cent) of those who stay away from certain streets and areas do so during the hours of darkness rather than during daylight. The survey asked respondents to mark the areas of that they avoided on a map. These maps are included as an appendix to the report and give an approximate indication of the areas most avoided during darkness by the residents of the area.

Gender differences are highly significant in relation to avoidance behaviour. While only 16 per cent of men avoided going out after dark ‘often’ or ‘always’ due to fear of crime, the level for women was far higher at 48 per cent. Likewise while only 11 per cent of men ‘often’ or ‘always’ avoided certain streets or areas of Hilldrop (see map displays) the level for women was 36 per cent. These high figures are similar to those found in the Islington Crime Survey in the Borough as a whole.

2.2.3. Beliefs about crime and offenders.

The survey asked a number of questions concerning respondents perception of victims and offenders in the Hilldrop area. Respondents opinions as to the groups that committed ‘most crime in the area’ were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(percentages)</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children under 16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>young people aged 16-24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>older people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Insiders and outsiders

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>people from the area</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people from the immediate surrounding area</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people from outside the area</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The strongest perception of the type of person who commits most crime in the area is of a young person between 16 and 24 who comes either from the Hilldrop area itself or from the immediate surrounding area. The fact that only 11 per cent of respondents held the positive belief that most crime was committed by people from outside the area compared with 50 per cent who believed offenders came from the Hilldrop area or the immediate surrounding area is a significant finding which should be taken into account in the development of crime prevention policy in the area.

Perceptions of who were the most frequent victims of crime in the Hilldrop area by gender and age were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>gender</th>
<th>(percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mostly men</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mostly women</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both equally</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>age</th>
<th>(percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mostly young people</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mostly old people</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mostly middle aged people</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it happens equally to all</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The victims of crime are seen as widely distributed through the community. A third of the sample see men and women equally as victims and just under half see crime impacting equally on all age groups. However there is a perception among a sizeable minority that certain groups, women and old people, face disproportional levels of victimization. When attempting to assess the existence of a consensus about victimization it is important to see whether there is a general agreement as to the disproportionate impact of crime on certain groups or whether it is only members of those groups who believe they are over victimized.

2.2.4 Perceptions of Change.

Respondents were asked whether they thought a number of types of crime in the area were more common less common, or about the same as they were five years ago:
Clearly, the general perception is that crime is rising. About half the sample see mugging, burglary and vandalism as having risen. Significantly, almost a third of respondents see both heroin dealing and heroin addiction as having increased in the area.

2.2.5 The amount of victimization.

2.2.5.1 Offences against property

Offences against property recorded by the survey were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>household burglary</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attempted burglary</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defacement or damage to dwelling</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theft of car, van or motorcycle</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>damage to car, van or motorcycle</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These levels of crime can be compared for those of the Borough as a whole recorded by the Islington Crime Survey (ICS). Considering ICS was conducted two years ago the 5 per cent of households suffering one or more burglaries compares favourably with the ICS figure for the Borough as a whole of 12 per cent of households and for the St Georges Ward (in which the Hilldrop area falls) of 23 per cent of households. The Hilldrop burglary level is closer to the 5 per cent of households recorded by the 1983 Home Office British Crime Survey as an average for England and Wales as a whole. As an inner city area Hilldrop has a significant but not
excessive level of property crime.

From the standpoint of the relationship between crime and street lighting it is important to know what proportion of such offences take place during the hours of darkness. Of those property offences reported to the survey 56 per cent took place after dark. It must be added however that the total number of such offences was small from a statistical standpoint and such a figure must therefore be treated with caution.

The proportion of offences reported to the police was 53 per cent. Of those not reported the following types of reasons were given: 59 per cent of those not reporting considered that the offence was not serious enough, 5 per cent said they did not report because no insurance was involved 10 per cent responded that the matter had been dealt with by another agency (e.g. the Council) and 26 per cent reported that they had no confidence in the police to solve such offences. The survey asked whether the victim knew the offender. In 10 per cent of property offences this was the case. Only 46 per cent of the sample had current burglary insurance. Of those that were not insured 41 per cent cited the high cost of insurance and 28 did not consider their property worth insuring.

2.2.5.2. Offences against persons.

Victimizations of individuals were recorded by the survey for households rather than individuals. Although only individuals were interviewed, they were asked about their own victimization experience and that of other members of their household. The figures below therefore refer to the percentage of households in which one or more incidents of victimization took place. In this way the maximum number of victimizations was recorded by the survey. The distribution was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mugged or robbed in the street</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physically attacked</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threatened with violence</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pestered by a group of people</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN ONLY sexually interfered with, assaulted or attacked</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN ONLY sexually pestered or insulted</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the small numbers involved it is best to restrict comments to the figures for all personal victimizations. Here the picture is one that would be expected for an area of this type. Nonwhites have a substantially higher victimization rate that whites, women higher than men and the age group with the highest victimization rate is the 16-24 group.
Taking all personal victimizations together 59 per cent took place during the hours of darkness, a similar proportion as for property offences. However there the similarity ends. Only 29 per cent of such offences were reported to the police 1 compared to the 53 per cent for property offences. The reason for not reporting such offences to the police was overwhelmingly that the incident was not considered serious enough. In 20 per cent of cases the offender was known to the victim.

2.2.6. Knowledge of other victims and offenders.

Besides their own experience, people's knowledge of the victimization of others and of victimization by others is an important influence upon their perception of the magnitude of crime as a problem. The survey asked:

Apart from your own household, do you personally know anyone living in this area who during the last 12 months ........

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures do not reveal anything about the extent of crime itself, rather they tell us how widespread is the knowledge about that crime that does exist. The comparatively high level of knowledge concerning mugging and street robbery suggests that such incidents are more talked about than burglary for example. This

1 It should be noted that the question of whether or not the incident was reported to the police was only asked for the most recent incident reported. Therefore the number of incidents which were surveyed in this case is less than the total incidents reported to the survey. Similar considerations apply to property offences.
may illustrate the greater impact of such offences on their victims. The figure of 24 per cent is identical to the finding for the Islington Crime Survey for the Borough as a whole (23 per cent).

There is also a relatively high knowledge (by comparison with victimization rates) of people who have committed various types of offences. This can be viewed in conjunction with the high proportion of residents who believe that the majority of crime is committed by people from the area or nearby. The levels of knowledge both of domestic violence and heroin taking are comparatively high. The question of heroin taking is dealt with in a separate section below.

2.2.7. Inter-racial incidents.

The extent of victimization between ethnic groups in the area was assessed by asking respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shouted insults at you</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physically assaulted you</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>damaged any of your property or stolen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anything from you</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic minorities were disproportionately affected by insulting behaviour. While only 8 per cent of whites had people of another race shout insults 22 per cent of black and 31 per cent of Asians had suffered this form of abuse.

However the predominant form of relationship between ethnic groups in the Hilldrop area friendly. When asked whether during the last 12 months anyone of a different race had 'given you any help or assistance' 32 per cent of respondents replied in the affirmative.

2.2.8. Conclusions

At first sight there appears a divergence between the general perception of who are the victims of crime and which groups actually sustain the highest victimization rates. Thus while people's perception that women are disproportionate victims is correct, the perceptions regarding old and young people tend to run in the opposite direction to the actual reported distribution of personal victimizations. However a word of caution is necessary before concluding that the perception of crime in the area diverges from its reality. Respondents may well have been thinking, when giving answers, of the impact rather than the distribution of crime. The identification of old people as disproportionate victims by comparison with young people may have been based, in other words, on the knowledge that the impact of crime is so much greater on an elderly person than it is likely to be on a young person.
2.3. The Community and the Police.

The survey aimed to assess the general relations between the police and the Hilldrop community and also to assess what were the crime priorities as far as local residents were concerned.

2.3.1. Police Community relations.

The survey asked whether people thought the number of police officers in the area both patrolling on foot and in cars was too many, too few or about the right number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Too Many</th>
<th>Too Few</th>
<th>Right Number</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>patrolling on Foot</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patrolling in cars</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just over a third of respondents (38 per cent) felt that the police have a good understanding of the area. 40 per cent however felt unable to give an opinion. When asked whether they thought the police treat all groups in the area fairly and equally, a similar proportion (38 per cent) agreed with 37 per cent registering a Don't Know response.

Belief that the police have a good understanding of the area generally varies positively with age. While 61 per cent of the over 65's and 44 per cent of the 45-65 age group held this belief, only 33 per cent of the 25-44 age group and 20 per cent of the 16-24 group did so. Age differences also had an impact when the survey asked whether police behaviour was a problem (among others) in the area. While 30 per cent of the 16-24 age group saw the behaviour of the police as either a big problem or a bit of a problem the figure fell to 22 per cent for the 25-44 age group and 9 per cent for the over 45s.

Police behaviour does not seem to be a high profile issue in Hilldrop as illustrated by the 40 per cent of respondents who have no opinion on the subject. But of those who do 60 per cent believe the police have a good understanding of the area and treat all groups fairly. However the 40 per cent of those who have an opinion on the issue (24 per cent of the sample) and disagree are a significant minority. When asked what groups they felt were not treated fairly the most significant group identified were young people and black people, each identified by 20 per cent of those having an opinion. This means that 24 per cent of the people of the Hilldrop area do not feel that the police treat all groups fairly and 19 per cent will identify young people and black people as the groups being treated unfairly.

Ethnic minorities did not have very different opinions to whites on these issues. Thus 36 per cent of whites and 42 per cent of blacks believed that the police had a good understanding of the area and 29 per cent of whites and 39 per cent of blacks felt that the police treated all groups in the area fairly.
Contact between police and residents was not high. Only 9 per cent of the sample knew any police officers well enough to chat to them and only 14 per cent knew their local Home Beat Officer by sight.

How do people feel about their contacts with the police? The survey asked whether respondents had been contacted by the police during the last 12 months and if so, how satisfied they were with the way the matter was handled. 13 per cent of respondents had been contacted by the police during the previous 12 month period. 40 per cent of this group felt dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way the matter had been handled. This is all the more surprising considering that in only 18 per cent of the cases where the respondent was contacted by the police was a search made and only 11 per cent of such encounters resulted in arrest. The police can hardly feel satisfied with such a situation. However they are not in a markedly different situation to Council agencies in this respect (all of which had contacted between 10 and 15 per cent of Hildrop residents over the 12 months prior to the survey) as the following table makes clear:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>SATISFIED OR</th>
<th>VERY SATISFIED</th>
<th>DISSATISFIED OR</th>
<th>VERY DISSATISFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>police</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBI Housing Department</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Office</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The performance of the police seems to be evaluated as slightly worse than social services, slightly better than housing officials and about on a par with Neighbourhood Office workers.

The survey also asked respondents to evaluate how the matter was dealt with in situations where they contacted the police themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>SATISFIED OR</th>
<th>VERY SATISFIED</th>
<th>DISSATISFIED OR</th>
<th>VERY DISSATISFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>police</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBI Housing Department</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Office</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 per cent of respondents had contacted the police during the 12 months prior to the survey (compared to Social Services 15 per cent, Housing Department 35 per cent, and Neighbourhood Office 24 per cent). In contacts initiated by the public the police do slightly better than other agencies including, it should be noted, the Neighbourhood Office. However the police, as with
other agencies, leave an unacceptably large proportion of those who approach them for assistance feeling unsatisfied. It should be also noted that the majority (77 per cent) of contacts made by respondents concerned matters of victimization, either personal or property. If to that is added a further 9 per cent of contacts that concerned rowdyism, noise, disputes, graffiti or other 'incivilities' then it is clear that the residents of Hilldrop are not using the police in any role as a 'general social service' but are approaching them on matters which fall within the professional competence of the police.

2.3.2. Police Efficiency

The survey asked respondents to evaluate police performance and to state what they thought police priorities should be.

---

I would like your opinions on how successful the police are at dealing with particular types of crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Succ-</th>
<th>Fairly Succ-</th>
<th>Not very Succ-</th>
<th>Not at all Succ-</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>essful</td>
<td>essful</td>
<td>successful</td>
<td>successful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>racist attacks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burglary in houses</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fights in the street</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vandalism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sexual assaults</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heroin dealing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mugging and street robbery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drunken driving</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violent domestic disputes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>child abuse</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The areas where police were evaluated as very or fairly successful were drunken driving (51 per cent), street fights (36 per cent), racist attacks 22 per cent and household burglary 20 per cent. On all other categories the police were rated very or fairly successful by under 20 per cent of respondents. Thus on most crimes the police were rated as not very or not at all successful by a substantial proportion of respondents. However the ratings may be compared with the figures (where available) for the Islington Crime Survey (ICS): For those crimes compared Hilldrop residents are likely to rate the police as in a similar way to the residents of Islington as a whole.
2.3.3. Public Priorities for policing.

Respondents were asked to pick out from a list those offences that they considered police should spend most time and least time upon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENCE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE IDENTIFYING IT AS A PRIORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sexual assaults on women</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>street robbery with violence</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of heroin and hard drugs</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burglary of people's homes</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racist attacks</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drunken driving</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The wide consensus across 80 per cent of Hilldrop community for the prioritization of sexual assault as an offence should be noted, as should the high priority given to combatting heroin and hard drugs. Also just under half the community are concerned that racial attacks should become a police priority.

Respondents were then asked to pick out those crimes upon which they considered that the police should spend least time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENCE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE IDENTIFYING IT AS A LOW PRIORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shoplifting</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prostitution</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>company fraud and embezzlement</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowdyism in the streets</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of cannabis, marihuana</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.4. Multi-agency intervention

The survey attempted to assess the basis for multi-agency intervention in victimization incidents in the Hilldrop area. Respondents were given a list of crime and victimization...
incidents and asked to assess which from a list of agencies would be the most suitable to intervene in a situation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE REGARDING IT AS SUITABLE TO INTERVENE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argument between neighbours over noisy music</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends and Neighbours</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Tenants or Resident’s association</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Environmental Health Officers</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A dispute between neighbours boiling over into violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends and Neighbours</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Tenants or Resident’s association</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly behaviour by a group of young people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Community Organizations</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>Battered women’s refuge</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>Child Abuse</td>
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<td>Social Services</td>
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<td>Police</td>
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<td>rape</td>
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<td>Social Services</td>
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<td>Battered women’s refuge</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mugging and street robbery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Tenants or Resident’s association</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heroin dealing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heroin addiction</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
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<td>Police</td>
<td>44</td>
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While the police were the main agency held responsible for dealing with victimization there was a clear understanding among a substantial body of respondents that other agencies had a role to play. In the case of disputes between neighbours over noisy music there was a clear preference that the local community itself rather than the police should be the initial recourse. This both illustrates the sense of trust that exists in the community and provides a basis on which the viability of dispute settlement and mediation might be considered in the future.

2.3.5. conclusions

There is a general desire for more police both foot and car, together with a small but not insignificant concern with police behaviour. People having had contact with the police are more likely to express dissatisfaction but not on levels any greater than for council services. There is a high level of agreement on those crimes seen as priorities for police action and in particular a high prioritization of sexual assault. The potential for other agencies to have a role in this area is understood. The role of friends and neighbours in dispute settlement for example is understood. However the formalization of such a measure as with a dispute settlement scheme is not yet understood by a large proportion of people as an effective crime prevention measure when compared with more conventional prevention strategies. (see section 2.5. below)

2.4. The Community and the Council.

2.4.1. Council Services

Respondents were asked to evaluate a number of Council services. The two most relevant to this report are street lighting and crime prevention. 62 per cent rated the Council as very successful or fairly successful in the provision of street lighting and 51 per cent rated the service in this area as not very or not at all successful. As regards crime prevention 20 per cent rated the Council as very or fairly successful and 44 per cent as not very or not at all successful.

2.4.2. The Neighbourhood Office

63 per cent had heard of the Council's Neighbourhood Office in the area. As noted already 24 per cent of respondents had contacted the Neighbourhood Office during the 12 months prior to the survey. In these cases 43 per cent were satisfied or very satisfied and 53 per cent dissatisfaction or very dissatisfied with the way their case was handled. In cases were the respondent had
been contacted by the office 58 per cent were satisfied or very satisfied and 35 per cent were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way their case was handled.

Those who had heard of the Office were asked to evaluate its performance from the standpoint of three criteria:

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<tr>
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<th>Very or fairly successful</th>
<th>Not very or not at all successful</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>getting in contact with Council services</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>listening to local people's complaints about the Council</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>giving local people a say in how Council services are run</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
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</table>

The most significant aspect of these findings is the large proportion of 'don't knows', people in this case who had heard of the Neighbourhood Office but felt unable to make a judgement one way or another as to its performance. Of those who were able to volunteer an opinion the low proportion who felt that the Neighbourhood Office gave them any influence over the operation of Council services should be noted. From the standpoint of the development of an effective community based crime prevention strategy the aim should be to improve the evaluation both of the service provided by the Neighbourhood Office and that provided by the local community groups.

2.5. **Attitudes to Crime Prevention.**

An attempt was made to ascertain which types of measures to combat crime residents of the area had most confidence in. This was done by asking respondents to rank in order of priority a list of possible measures first for crime prevention in general and then for specific types of crime. Two qualifications should be made at the outset concerning this technique. Firstly respondents are likely to choose those measures they know about and avoid those they do not understand or have not heard of, and secondly, there may have been other items which would have gained support which were not included on the list. However there has been a considerable debate on crime prevention and policing policy over the last few years in the media and amongst professionals. More confidence can therefore be placed in such results than if the same questionnaire had been administered, say, ten years ago.

2.5.1. Crime Prevention in general

Respondents were asked to prioritise those measures they thought would do most to reduce crime in the area:
More patrols by 'Home Beat' police officers: 75%
Better locks on doors and windows: 62%
A Neighbourhood Watch scheme: 51%
Better street lighting: 49%
Faster police response to 999 calls: 43%
More recreation facilities for young people: 43%
Regular meetings between tenants and the police: 29%
Quicker Council Repair to damage by Vandals: 23%
A local dispute mediation scheme: 6%

The result was a prioritisation of Home Beat policing, 'target hardening' Neighbourhood Watch and better street lighting. Substantial proportions wanted faster police response time and improved recreation facilities for young people. There was less concern about regular meetings between local people and the police and innovatory crime prevention measures such as a local dispute mediation scheme were not prioritised.

2.5.2. Crimes against women

Respondents were also asked what measures would do most to prevent particular types of crime or crime by particular groups of offenders. As regards domestic violence, rape and sexual assault and harassment the sample as a whole prioritised harsher penalties by the courts for these offences (57 per cent), self defence courses for women (43 per cent), better street lighting (26 per cent) and the availability of more women police officers (24 per cent).

2.5.3. Young People and Crime

As regards crime among young people under 21 better control by parents was identified as a priority by 61 per cent and harsher sentences by magistrates by 35 per cent. Of those measures which come within the range of Council responsibilities, more youth clubs and recreation facilities for young people was prioritised by 48 per cent of the sample.
2.5. A note on Heroin in the Hilldrop Area

Concern has been shown recently about the question of heroin in the Hilldrop area. This section has therefore been added to bring together the evidence from various parts of the survey on this question.

-14 per cent see heroin dealing as a bit of a problem or a big problem.

-30 per cent see heroin dealing as having increased in the area over the last 5 years and 31 per cent see heroin addiction as having increased over the same period.

-5 per cent knew some one who has taken heroin regularly.

-36 per cent rate the police as not very or not at all successful in tackling heroin dealing.

-63 per cent rated the control of heroin and hard drugs as a police priority.
The approach to multi-agency intervention which we have adopted in this report is a realistic one. That is on the most basic level we take public opinions and fears about crime seriously. We do not start with a dismissal of, say, women's fear of crime, as an irrationality which is best dealt with simply on the level of getting rid of the fear. Rather we start with women's fear of crime - the parts of Hilldrop where women are frightened to go out at night, their priorities of policing and the various criticisms of the service delivery of the various crime control agencies. We start with public fear and dissatisfaction as *ipso facto* the prime indicator of the problem. We then see how we can materially change things so as to allay these fears and satisfy the 'consumers' of public safety. That is we start from what the public who pay for public safety want rather than what experts say they should want. This is in contrast to the common occurrence in crime prevention, where experts regularly inform people whether they should be fearful or not. We hold no platform for the platitude that the fear of crime is more of a problem than crime itself. It is the prerogative of the public to decide what levels of crime they will tolerate: when they decide to be fearful or not. Public relations exercises in 'fear control' are no match for changing the circumstances which generate fear.

We believe we can best solve problems by changing the physical and social environment to fit people's expressed needs rather than changing people's lives to fit our own preconceptions. We will recommend changes in lighting, locks and bolts, council insurance schemes, police practices, education in the schools, etc. Their success will be measured by public accolade not by expert self-congratulation. Too often in every aspect of urban design, it is the planners who publicly assess their own work, whilst the public is left to grumble about their schemes in private. And in making environmental changes intended to lower crime rates, we must have due - and priority - regard for people's assessment of these changes. That is it is no use if the introduction of searchlights as an excuse for lighting drastically reduces crime yet leaves an estate full of people totally displeased with the aesthetics of the environment. It is next to useless if we minimize the crime rate against old people by locking them up in urban fortresses, leaving them isolated and unhappy.
Facts and Opinions: The Construction of the Rational Input

This study provides us with a series of facts and it collates community opinions. It tells us the real rate of crime, providing more exhaustive figures than crimes known to the police, the level of incivilities and harassment, the true extent of serious abuse. It further indicates the amount of and outcome of police-public encounters, the priorities of policing which the public demand and their degree of pleasure or displeasure at police and council performance in tackling crime. It measures levels of fear of crime and its actual effect on people's behaviour. All of these items are facts, and they are the facts which this project is out to change. But it also collects opinions: the public assessment of police and council efficiency at dealing with various crimes and their opinions as to what measures should be taken to tackle crime. Here the public may or may not be correct. They may, for example, believe the police are ineffective where they are, in fact, are effective, and effective where they are, in reality, ineffective. They may believe mediation schemes are unimportant and perhaps not really know what such schemes are they may believe that neighbourhood watch is effective against burglary with no real evidence for this. In short, some of these opinions may simply be incorrect. What these questions do tell us is whether certain interventions would or would not have public support. This could be crucial in many instances: for example, it would be very difficult to set up neighbourhood watch schemes in areas which do not have sufficient community support.

What is important to stress is that we cannot move from survey data directly to policy. Where this is attempted, as in many otherwise laudable reports (e.g. the recent Safe Neighbourhood Unit's Report on Lansdowne Green), there is always a trace of sleight of hand. What survey data gives one is the facts of crime, and of public priorities - there policy must attempt to achieve. It gives public opinions on intervention - these the wise policy-maker would be advised to take good note of. But it is only by welding public goals and opinions with expert knowledge of what institutions are likely to achieve these aims, that any policy ever likely to be effective will be constructed. A major part of this process is building on the state of the art: constructing policies which have already been tried out elsewhere, rejecting measures which have proved ineffective. There are, of course, many people who will advocate their own particular interest in crime prevention, be it Neighbourhood Watch, lighting, more
youth facilities, extra beat policing, etc. as if it were obvious that these institutions will work. This study attempts to use methods which have either a proven track record or are innovations based on principles of crime reduction which have a high chance of success.

Principles of Intervention

Behind our policy recommendations lie a series of principles which have been well established in criminological research, on both sides of the Atlantic.

1. **Successful policing depends on public cooperation.** Most crimes are 'solved', not by police intervention, but by public witnessing and the police interviewing of named suspects and witnesses. Paramount then are attempts to increase the information flow from public to police.

2. **Most control of anti-social behaviour is achieved by the public themselves.** This is achieved sometimes indirectly by members of the public intervening, but most frequently by the way in which most offenders are put off offending in the presence of witnesses. It is important to ensure that particularly important is pedestrian traffic flow.

3. **Most Offenders are Unaware of the Consequences of their Action**

   Burglars seldom meet their victims and have little idea of the distress that they evoke. What to them is usually a simple utilitarian act to them, is to others as a fundamental invasion of their home: Adolescent boys harass women without any idea of the fear that they cause.

4. **Much crime is minor and poorly motivated.** It is not caused by an ineluctable desire to commit crime. Simple target hardening can deter such offenders.

5. **Victim Support is as important as crime control.** The major aim of a scientific criminology is to minimize the impact of crime on the community. This impact is a simple product of the amount and nature of the crime on the number and nature of the victims. Both parts of
the equation are manipulable. To reduce crime by, say, a laudable 10% would be worthless if its impact on victims increased by a similar amount. As the total elimination of crime is a utopian dream we are left with the task of reducing the crime rate and cushioning the impact on victims. Similar principles exercise their influence on other social problems such as dealing with motor accidents.

(6) **Successful Crime Intervention is Multi-agency and occurs at different Parts in the Process of Offending**

We have argued throughout for multi-agency intervention and the extent to which each agency interacts with each other. We must have also stressed the need to act at different stages in the process, e.g. anti-crime education acts on the motivation to commit crime, target hardening is the possibility, public-police cooperation on detection rate, and victim support on the after-effects of the crime.

**Problems, Priorities, Principles and Possibilities**

Our process of policy formation therefore involves finding the distribution of the **problems** of different groups and areas in the community. It identifies the public **priorities** as to crime control and it applies **principles** determined from studies of crime prevention. Lastly, it looks at possibilities. That is within the range of options, there are those which the policy maker has the resources and the political ability to change and those where he or she is limited, and these form a spectrum of possibility. To increase employment levels dramatically, for example, is difficult, to change the lighting system much less so, to target harden comparatively easy. But it is out of these few processes that our policy recommendations must be derived.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. TARGET HARDENING

We suggest that as a major initiative to reduce household burglary the Council should install anti-burglar locks on all ground floor doors and windows of the public housing stock. In addition, the doors and frames should be strengthened. Corner houses are particularly at threat, here we should ensure that lighting is adequate, if not better, than elsewhere. In addition, first floor windows of corner houses should also be fitted with screw-in locks.

The elderly and single occupants should be given particular priority with the provision of spy-holes for extra security.

We are opposed to any structural changes involving, for example, excessive bars or limitations of access, which have the effect of damaging the general aesthetics and quality of life of residents.

2. POLICING

"In recent years, although police expenditure and manpower has risen, the demands on the police service has continued to grow at an even faster rate. Decisions are continually being made with regard to the deployment of the number of available officers so that the most efficient and effective use can be made of the resources at hand. Crime surveys and crime statistics enable police to consider the view of the community against the background of the level of reported crime and crime trends. Such information enables police management to identify priorities to be tackled taking into account, not only the volume of crime, but also the importance of particular problems in the eyes of the public. These problems and competing demands include not only crime prevention and detection but a whole range of services and duties undertaken to improve the safety and security of the community." (Metropolitan Police, Holloway Division Strategy, 1987)

Our central principle is that successful police is dependent on public cooperation. In order to do this we must ensure (a) that policing follows as closely as possible public priorities; (b) that close interpersonal links are formed between the public and the community; (c) that police malpractices which alienate sections of the population are minimized; (d) the police effectiveness is raised in order to inspire public confidence.
We have seen that the public are quite clear as to their policy priorities. These are:

- SEXUAL ATTACKS ON WOMEN
- STREET ROBBERY
- HEROIN DEALING
- BURGLARY
- DRUNKEN DRIVING

These are, of course, the same priorities identified in the ICS for Islington as a whole. It is important and encouraging that the local Police Divisional strategy has prioritized some - although not all of these crimes. It is disappointing that clear up rate in all these areas is low and the public assessment of police efficiency - with the single exception of drunken driving - is lowest for these priority crimes.

Prioritization does not, of course, mean ignoring other crimes (such as auto-theft): it simply means that in a world of scarce resources, some policing priorities are inevitably of greater importance than others. The first task is, then, to increase effectiveness in the area of priority crimes - we will return to the specific crimes later, but stress once again that to achieve this task both police and public effort and cooperation will be necessary.

2.1 Beat Policing

There is an overwhelming support in Hilldrop for more beat policing. This is in common with surveys conducted throughout London. Beat policing can, of course, be productive and counter-productive. Aggressive policing falls in the latter category and fortunately is relatively rare. Research has shown that beat policing is effective, not that it deters crime on the spot - the likely offender is well capable to keeping an eye out for the local police officer on his/her beat - but rather, in that it gains public confidence and support and therefore increases the information flow about crime from the public to the
police. As we have stressed, this is the major dynamic of successful detection, and we therefore fully endorse the public demand for extra beat officers.

What is vital is that these police officers should make acquaintanceship with as wide a section of the population as possible. Our results show that the level of personal acquaintanceship with police officers is low, and success in this field will be early monitored by the next stage of our survey. It is important to underline the need for the role of Beat Officer to be not a low status job but evaluated as an important job for a career-orientated police officer.

2.2 Police Malpractices

The Principles of Policing and Guidance for Professional Behaviour of the Metropolitan Police has an important section which stresses the vital importance of fair and lawful behaviour.

"Any unreasonable, abrupt and over-zealous action by us will not achieve an orderly society, except perhaps in the very short term, but will rapidly lose for the Force its public support. And, since a police service without public support will not be able to police by consent, and in the long term will not be able to police at all, one of the very cornerstones of democratic government will have been put at risk.

On the other hand, by acknowledging always that you are a friend, a guide and a servant of your fellow citizens, and never their master, by adopting an appropriately firm but conciliatory and helpful manner to everyone you meet, and by acting always in ways which are manifestly fair and lawful, so naturally attracting public acceptance of police activity, you and your service colleagues can help to sustain our democratic way of life and build up a store of public goodwill to be drawn on in the future.

It is vital therefore that you are aware constantly of the potential that each of your actions has for good or harm and of the importance for the success of policing and of democracy, not only of those actions themselves but of the style you adopt when going about your business. You are part of the complex machinery by which this country remains democratic and free - and an understanding of that should colour your every action." (1985,pp.20-1)

This forthright statement contains the important insight of the
link between legitimacy and effectiveness. Only a police force which acts strictly within the rule of law can gain public support, only a force which has public support can deal effectively with crime.

Unfortunately, a substantial minority of the population at Hilldrop— as in other parts of the inner city do not think that the police act fairly to all and a proportion of people maintain they or their friend— have witnessed police malpractices. It is also important to note that it is, ironically, often this group of people who have the greatest information with regards to crime and who should be the prime source of information flow from public to the police. It is vital that public respect for the police is increased and that any malpractices are seen by the public to result in speedy and just disciplinary action.

3. THE ROLE OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD FORUM IN CRIME CONTROL

We recommend that the Neighbourhood Forum becomes the basis of a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme and that this scheme is sufficiently funded in order to carry out regular meetings, leafletting, etc.

Public-initiated neighbourhood watch schemes as occur frequently in the United States have a much greater viability than police-initiated schemes because of three reasons particularly pertinent to the situation in London:

i. police schemes are generally insufficiently funded and pose an additional burden on already overstretched limited personnel;

ii. public schemes minimize fears of the violation of civil liberties and accusations of undue 'snooping' by the State;

iii. public schemes can deal with a wide range of issues, some of a non-legal or sub-legal character (eg 'minor' harassment) which would not be in the area of operation of police work. This would also stretch into general estate and environmental problems which are part of the present role of the Neighbour Forums.

We want to suggest that the neighbourhood forum thus incorporates a crime prevention panel and should of necessity have a regular liais.
with the local police with regards to problems of crime and policing the area.

The central role in crime prevention of the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme would be in receiving and discussing public grievances in this area; consulting with the police, particularly the beat officers.

An important role of the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme would be to be the basis of a Victim Support Scheme. That is, in consultation with Islington Victim Support, the members of the Watch should constitute a support scheme for Victims on the estate. Police referrals with regards to Victims should be on a regular basis and form an essential part of the liaison.

We would suggest also that the neighbourhood forum might be a useful site for the development of tenant mediation schemes, which are at present being mooted.

The role then of the forum-based neighbourhood watch would extend from crime out to more minor incivilities. In the latter range a campaign against dog mess which is identified as a big problem by a large percentage of residents could be mounted from this source, as could mediation with regards to noisy parties, etc.

We are convinced that a neighbourhood watch group on this basis, which is well resourced, which is active rather than reactive, and which has a wide range of activities to concern itself with, would be a viable and vital link in crime control in Hilldrop.
4. EDUCATION

4.1 Schools

The schools have a crucial role to play in the prevention of crime and sexual and racial harassment. Not only is the teaching of civic responsibility a major task of education but, as numerous studies have shown, late adolescence is the high point of criminal involvement especially amongst boys. We feel that a high priority should be placed on the development of a course which directly confronts problems of crime, sexism, and racism and that this should be introduced as part of the curriculum in local schools as a matter of urgency. The effects of crime should be spelt out to pupils in terms of its effects on the lives of both the victims and the community as a whole. Imaginative use of videos and victims' accounts of their ordeals should be encouraged. The course should include, not only problems of crime, but also of harassment. The problem of the harassment of women has to be directly countered, especially amongst adolescent males.

A first step would be a discussion among teachers of the place of such a course within the curriculum. Approaches should be made by Islington Council to local teacher-training colleges and centres and the teaching unions to discuss such proposals. Ideally such a course, when implemented, should be monitored and its effects on pupils' attitudes objectively assessed.
Aside from the moral and substantive role of the school in combatting crime, its ability to integrate pupils into the community by providing a vocational element in education of relevance to employment opportunities is vital. It cannot be overstressed that education which delivers the goods in terms of numeracy, literacy and skills relevant to the job market is a potent antidote to crime. Schools which provide such instrumental rewards have inevitably the lowest truancy rates, and those areas with the lowest truancy the least delinquency. A major drive to counter truancy in the local schools is of great importance.

4.2 Anti-Crime Exhibition

It is of vital importance that offenders are made aware of the impact of crime on their victims. We propose that an anti-crime exhibition be constructed consisting of pictures of victims, visual illustrations of the impact of crime on the community and, if possible, a video. This should be developed by the Neighbourhood Forum, the council, the police and the Islington Victim Support Group. It should be exhibited in the local schools, the library, the neighbourhood office, youth clubs and religious organizations. It should be publicized in the local and national media. The basic message of the exhibition should be to bring over to offenders the impact of crime upon victims and the moral context of crime - crime as a choice rather than something to be excused. And, of course, not only crime per se but the problem of harassment, particularly sexual, racial and of the aged should be adequately covered.
5. VICTIM SUPPORT

For those who have suffered from or are vulnerable to the impact of crime there are a number of practical steps that the Council can take.

5.1 Women

We have pinpointed women as a prime target of crime in Hilldrop. The Council should approach Women's Aid with a view to expanding women's refuges off the estate, and should press the police to establish a system of women police officers specializing in dealing with domestic violence and sexual attacks on women.

5.2 Insurance

The council should instigate an area wide home insurance scheme. Inexpensive facilities should be particularly available for pensioners and single parents.

5.3 Victim Help

Aid should be provided to assist the development of a voluntary victim support scheme on the estate. This should be based on the Neighbourhood Forum/Neighbourhood Watch as a scheme with regular police referral.

5.4 Offenders

The possibility should be investigated of ensuring that where offences committed on the estate result in Community Service Orders these are performed on the estate with an emphasis on practical socially useful project.
6. LIGHTING

We have made detailed recommendations in terms of lighting in the Appendix to this report. Lighting in general should facilitate greater pedestrian passage at night which creates a greater public social control over crime.

7. THE PRIORITY CRIMES

We have stressed that the priority crimes, with the exception of drunken driving, are the ones where the public has least confidence in police effectiveness. Further, that what is required is a multi-agency approach to these problems. Let us briefly detail how our recommendations can be applied in these areas:

7.1 Sexual Attacks on Women

We have pinpointed, utilizing the maps, the areas of greatest fear of crime for women. Improved lighting should aid pedestrian traffic flow, whilst beat policing should pay particular attention to these areas. It is important that the shift system for beat policing involves evening patrols. Women in Hilldrop show a great support for self-defence classes. These should be initiated by the Neighbourhood Office. Regular reports of problems in the area should be collated by the Forum in liaison with the police and women in the community. Women should be encouraged to report harassment by virtue of local police women specializing in these areas. Anti-sexist education in the schools and the exhibition should place a priority on sexual attacks and harassment.

We have pinpointed the areas of Hilldrop where women are frightened to walk at night. We note also the virtual curfew of a substantial section of the population. It is outrageous in a civilised society that it is impossible for people to walk out at night because of fear of crime. One major target of this project by virtue of changes in lighting, policing and public awareness is to eliminate these no-go areas from Hilldrop.
7.2 Heroin Dealing

The survey shows that there is a small, yet significant problem, of heroin use on the estate. It is important to adjust police priorities to deal with this problem, distinguishing clearly 'hard' drugs which the public are concerned about, and 'soft' drugs, particularly cannabis, which the public feel the police should spend less time on. There is often widespread public knowledge of where heroin is being dealt. The public should be encouraged by a leaflet campaign put out jointly by the police and the Neighbourhood Forum to pinpoint the likely offenders. It should be stressed that the low level dealer is a relatively easy target for police action, yet often restraint occurs with the strategy in mind of trying to trace the 'big' dealers. We would, however, agree here with James Q. Wilson, the crime-adviser to the present American Administration, that it is best to arrest the low level dealers, as they are the most detectable and the necessary link in the chain.

7.3 Burglary

The main line of defence against burglary is not neighbourhood watch - where all evidence points to its irrelevance - but target hardening and acting against the fences. We have outlined our plans for target hardening. It is important to realize the extent to which burglary involves the targeting of disposable (i.e. saleable) items. Gold jewellery, video records, televisions, electrical goods, are particularly at risk. Only a small proportion of the proceeds of burglary goes to close relatives: much has to be sold in the 'hidden economy' of pubs and semi-legitimate retail outlets. It is difficult to know how to deal with jewellery apart from patient detective work, but most electrical goods have their numbers registered. We would suggest that the neighbourhood forum/watch scheme, in collaboration with the police, should engage in a major leafletting campaign which urges everyone to take note of the numbers on their electrical goods, that the leaflet should involve a form for them to register these numbers and keep in a safe place.
It is vital that, once such an exercise is completed, that it is used effectively in order to deter fencing. On a policing level this suggests the regular checking of second-hand retail outlets in the area of stolen goods of the numbers registered. Secondly, a publication in the local newspaper and the neighbourhood office of the numbers of goods stolen. This would advise people in the area that if they have bought second-hand goods recently, that these are the numbers of goods that have been stolen that receiving is an offence and of the possible amnesty if the goods are returned to the police. We have no high hopes of the return of goods, rather than the publication of numbers and the indication of the possibility of the criminal offence of receiving being committed would be a significantly greater deterrent than occurs at present. The crime of burglary subsists on the widespread practice of receiving. The burglar at least realizes that he is committing a crime, the member of the public who receives may simply turn a blind eye.

With regards to new rental and retail electrical equipment such as videos and televisions, we suggest that local shops regularly supply to the police a list of numbers by area. The actual name of the customer might also be registered. This data, if computerised locally, would allow a very rapid check on stolen property.

Lastly, we emphasize the importance of an insurance scheme to cushion victims. Those who are most severely affected by burglary being those who are poorest and *ipso facto* those who are not insured.

7.4 Street Robbery

Our strategy in terms of street robbery involves parallels to sexual attacks in that lighting, self-defence and beat policing will greatly help. Street robbery, of course, implies, like burglary, fencing: a proportion at least of this property arrives in local shops. We suggest that the careful noting by the police of the characteristics of jewellery, etc. stolen and a vigilant stance in terms of local second-hand jewellery and precious metal shops would be of assistance.
Measuring Success and Failure

1. Monitoring Implementation

In the final report we shall detail the degree to which the implementation of the policy has occurred. Some of our suggestions may prove unacceptable, others may be only partly implemented, whilst others may even be developed further than we have suggested.

The Stage 3 process of monitoring implementation is as important as monitoring the final outcome. Only too frequently methods of crime intervention are rejected which have only been half-heartedly attempted or which have been so ill-funded as to be very unlikely to succeed.

2. Separating Out Input

This project involves a multi-agency and hence multi-factor approach to input. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to separate out which factors will have had the greatest impact on the crime rate. Indeed, we have stressed the interactive nature of these factors - a change in lighting may enhance changes in policing, etc. Our interest, in this project, is whether the package is working - it is the job of other experimental studies - some of which the Centre is at present conducting - to study the effects of one factor alone.

3. Long Term and Short term Effects

We are suggesting changes which may have an immediate impact and others which have much longer. (cf. target hardening if education). We are testing, of course, the most immediate changes rather than those which will have a benefit in the long run. Care, however, must be taken to allow sufficient time after Stage 3 in order to be able to measure even those factors likely to have an immediate impact.

What will a successful outcome look like?

In the final phase of this programme we will be looking at the following indicators:
(1) Drop in Criminal Victimization Rates, noting the possibility of a general drop and/or specific drops in particular crimes. We would, of course, be particularly interested in the 'priority crimes'. Note this may or may not be accompanied with a drop in crimes reported to the police. It is perfectly feasible that increased public confidence in the police gives rise to an increase in the rates of crimes known to the police because of increased reporting, whilst a real drop in overall victimization has occurred.

(2) Drop in Incivilities

We would hope for a drop in incivilities, such as harassment, neighbourhood noise, dog mess, etc. A higher general assessment of the area should occur.

(3) Drop in Fear of Crime

There should be a drop in the levels of fear of crime, avoidance behaviour, fear of going out at night as indicated by our surveys, but with due regard to the maps of the area. Crime should drop in its portion as a problem in the area.

(4) Higher Assessment of Agencies Legitimacy and Effectiveness

There should be a more positive assessment of the various agencies concerned with crime from Police to Council Agencies.

(5) All other Factors being held Constant

These changes are dependent, of course, on the 'exterior' factors of changes in unemployment rates, social composition of the area, etc. All of these are monitored by the survey. It is obviously important to be aware of these outside pressures and not to fall into the fallacy of believing that our input is the only input into Hilldrop which will affect criminal behaviour.
(6) **Displacement of Crime**

In addition we have an area identified to test displacement and will use as control the overall changes in the crime rate of Islington. We have an advantage in having data from the First Islington Crime Survey (1985) and a second survey in 1988.

If we look at the cross-Borough and Hilldrop surveys we have four points in time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICS 1</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEIS 1</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS 2</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEIS 2</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Islington Crime Surveys contain within them the Enumeration Districts which constitute Hilldrop. This will allow us to have a four-point series for crime rates, policing policies, etc. for Hilldrop, together with the control of a comparison between changes in Hilldrop and changes in the crime rate of Islington as a whole.

**CONCLUSION**

We have now completed the first two stages of a unique inner city crime prevention project. This has involved the development of a victimization survey capable of covering a wide range of crime and incivilities. It has surveyed and developed a multiagency package with the interest of having a measurable impact on crime in the area. Above all it intends to monitor both the implementation of the schemes and their effectiveness. These next two stages promise to be an exciting, if exacting exercise.
APPENDIX 1

PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL REPORT

To carry out an in-depth study into crime, policing, community and other environmental problems in the Hilldrop area we had to develop a research strategy which took into account the following research problems:

1. We had to be able to make predictions from the data of risk populations and risk parts of the area. Furthermore, our data had to be suitable for policy development.

2. We had to generate a large enough sample for accurate analysis of sub-population groups particularly on people characterised by combinations of age, gender, and, if possible, ethnicity.

3. As this study was carried out with a small budget, it had to be cost-effective.

4. As Hilldrop is a small geographical area, criminal victimisation was likely to be a relatively rare occurrence and we had to be certain of generating enough data on victims to make worthwhile and statistically safe observations.

These problems are not new ones for research of this type, and our task, therefore, became one of generating the largest and most accurate data inside these parameters bearing in mind our limited resources. Previous research, for example, the 'British Crime Survey' (1983, 1985), the 'Policy Studies Institute' (1983) and the 'Islington Crime Survey' (1986), had indicated that younger people were more likely to experience criminal victimisation (particularly women in the case of the latter survey) and we, therefore decided to oversample this group. Whilst this could effect the overall level of accuracy we felt that it would not only achieve a greater level of accuracy for sub-samples, but that the huge sample size, as a proportion of total households in the area, would minimalise this initial risk. At the conclusion of the fieldwork we felt vindicated in this calculation as we had interviewed individuals from 56% of all households in the area.

For these reasons and because we felt that utilisation of the electoral register was problematic, we adopted a sampling strategy based on a representative sample of households which were selected from the enumeration
districts which would act as the primary sampling units. From these, individuals would be randomly selected for interview utilising a grid along the lines of the method outlined by Kisch (1965).

The General Sample Design

The target area for the survey was the 'wider' Hilldrop area, in Islington, which is boundaried by four busy roads: Camden Road, Brecknock Road, Dalmeny Avenue and Carleton Road. It is co-terminus with the following enumeration districts AQ 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and AQ 38.

We decided not to use the electoral register to construct our sample because it is notoriously inaccurate in inner city areas due to the transient nature of a section of the population, the fact that not all households appear on the registered and because our target population was residents over the age of 16.

Furthermore, we knew from local information that there were likely to be a large number of void (empty) properties in the area due to the fact that several blocks of council housing were being rehabilitated. We felt that the combined effect of these problems could create further complications at the fieldwork stage, and we were keen to keep a tight grip on that part of the survey.

Utilisation of enumeration districts (E.D.s) as primary sampling units offered certain advantages. The E.D.s were co-terminus with the survey area, it would be easier to maintain strict fieldwork supervision, and we not only could be fairly certain of generating a large enough sample of households, but we would also obtain information on other members of the household as well as the individual householder who was interviewed.

There are 12 E.D.s which are co-terminus with the survey area. Given the number of households in the area, and from our previous experience of conducting surveys in inner city areas (The 'Islington Crime Survey' 1986 and the "Broadwater Farm Survey' 1986) we felt that we could project a minimum response rate of 70%. As the Survey had incorporated a consultation stage, as outlined in the Introduction, and as we had, through experience, been able to fine-tune our fieldwork supervision we were quietly confident of generating a 80% response rate.
As we had to oversample younger people, in order to make projections of the number of interviews we would generate we had to project eligibility rates for people in the special sub-samples. For the 16 plus sample, we assumed that there would be at least one eligible person per address who would respond 70% of the time. For the 16-44 sample, we assumed we would locate an eligible person 70% of the time who would respond 70% of the time. For the 16-24 sample we assumed we would locate an eligible person in 30% of those households who would respond 70% of the time. These projected eligibility rates are higher than the Census estimates for people in these age groups, but the experience of the 'P.S.I's 'Survey of Londoners' (1983), the 'Islington Crime Survey' (1986) and the 'Broadwater Farm Survey' (1986) indicated that this was what we were likely to find in the field. We, thus divided the general sample into the following three subsamples:

(a) X sample - consisting of all residents over the age of 16.
(b) Y sample - consisting of all residents between the ages of 16 and 44.
(c) Z sample - consisting of all residents between the ages of 16 and 24.

Our enumerator was given the list of enumeration districts and the relevant ordnance survey maps. For each enumeration district he was able to identify the number of household units and starting from a randomly selected starting point between 0 and 9 was able to draw up the address sheets. Although every household held the possibility of being interviewed, subject to eligibility by age, it was necessary for obvious reasons, not to start at household number 1 in every enumeration district. The address sheets were arranged so that for every seven addresses, three were X sample and two each were Y and Z sample. Each address also had a randomly selected digit, which would be used by the interviewers when selecting the individual for interview.

Given our bottom-line projected response rate of 70% we could make the following projection:

Table A.1 Projected Number of Interviews 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Issued</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X (16 plus)</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y (16-44)</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z (16-24)</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But, as confirmed by our enumerator, there were a relatively high number of voids which would affect this initial projection. This balanced out against our own expectations of a 80% plus response rate and we thus felt that we were likely to generate circa 600 interviews which would be sufficient to facilitate safe analysis of sub-sections of the population in the area.

After the elimination of voids, one would make the following projection:

Table A.2  Projected number of Interviews 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Issued (minus voids)</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X (16 plus)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y (16-44)</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z (16-24)</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of our projected eligibility rates, the fieldwork results show the following:

Table A.3  Project and Actual Eligibility Rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Projected Rate</th>
<th>Actual Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y (16 plus)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y (16-44)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z (16-24)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, households were assigned to each sub-sample by the enumerator on the basis of randomly selected numbers. Each address had its selection digit, and these were passed over to the interviewers in sheets of on average, 24 addresses. The interviewers were also given a separate sheet to record specific information on each address: the time they called, the result of an encounter, the first names of any householders eligible for interview and other data to facilitate tight fieldwork supervision and the expectation of high quality data. The interviewers were also given an Identity Card with their photograph on it and a letter to be delivered to each household informing them of the fact that an interviewer would be calling.
Interviewing and Fieldwork Supervision

All interviewers had to attend a compulsory training session in which they were given a talk on the research objectives of the surveys, taken through the questionnaire in detail, and instructed in doorstep sampling and interviewing techniques. They also had to test the questionnaire on each other and once in the field they were continually briefed and debriefed.

On the doorstep, the interviewers would first find out the names of all residents living in the household whose age fell inside the parameters of the designated sample. If the household was eligible for interview, they would utilise the grid on the selection sheet to randomly select the person to seek to interview. If the selected interviewer was unavoidable, no substitution was allowed, and they had to make an appointment and/or call back on another occasion.

The fieldwork supervisor who was highly experienced, debriefed the interviewers on every address and checked all their paperwork. Eight interviews were disqualified over the fieldwork period. Two of them for incompleted interviews and six because the interviewers had failed to correctly comply with their instructions in completing the information forms with which they were issued. Once word of the fieldwork supervisor's action had filtered through to the other interviewers, we found that we had no further trouble of this nature. These eight interviews are counted in our final results as refusals.

The information sheet proved invaluable in reducing the number of 'No contacts' as the interviewer had to record the time they visited each address. After unsuccessful calls, it was, thus, possible to estimate the likeliest time the householder would be at home. It also facilitated random checks by the fieldwork supervisor and he carried out checks on 150 households where interviews had been carried out and on 100 properties which had been recorded as void or ineligible for interview.

This strict level of fieldwork supervision, enabled us to generate high quality data and a high response rate.

In some cases, the interviewers found that the householder(s) had an insufficient knowledge of English to carry out the interview. As we didn't have the resources to supply an interpreter, we were forced to count them as
refusals. They can be summarised by E.D. and language as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AQ28</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AQ28</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ28</td>
<td>Begali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ30</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ30</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ32</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ35</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ35</td>
<td>Czechoslovakian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ36</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ38</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ38</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ38</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12 Households.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fieldwork Results

Piloting
A pilot study was conducted prior to the survey to test both the fieldwork method and the draft questionnaire. It took the form of the Research Team interviewing friends and ten interviews being conducted in an adjacent area to the Hilldrop area. As a result, some questionnaire revisions were made.

Interviewers
As outlined previously in this Report, the interviewers were trained, briefed, and closely supervised in the field.

Fieldwork Results
Table A.4 provides an analysis of the responses as calculated from the fieldwork records.
Table A.4. Analysis of Responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issued Sample</th>
<th>X Sample</th>
<th>Y Sample</th>
<th>Z Sample</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LESS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Voids (Empty properties)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Addresses with no-one of sample age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Addresses Eligible for Survey</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No Contact after 4 calls plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Refusals</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Not Interviewed</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total INTERVIEWED | 346 | 172 | 78 | 596 |

RESPONSE RATE (of all households eligible): 85.02%

We feel that the final fieldwork results vindicate the time and effort we put into the Consultation Stage (see 'Introduction'), the relatively extensive training session for interviewers, and, most importantly, the strict supervision of interviewers which combined with the various innovations we were able to introduce in the field as a result of our previous experiences in carrying out inner-city research projects.

The response rate is high and is particularly favourable in comparison with other Inner London surveys.
Table A5. Response Rates of Recent Crime Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Crime Survey</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCS - GLC Area</td>
<td></td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCS - North of England</td>
<td></td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCS - Inner City Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Crime Survey (1985)</td>
<td></td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islington Crime Survey (1986)</td>
<td></td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadwater Farm Survey (1986)</td>
<td></td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham Crime Survey (1986)</td>
<td></td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Neighbourhood Watch Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Wave (1987)</td>
<td></td>
<td>55% to 69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most importantly the number of 'no contacts' in Hilldrop is miniscule. This could have potentially led to distorted results - see Hope and Dowd's (1987). This is encouraging given the parameters of the study and the importance of the final Hilldrop Survey.
APPENDIX II
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE EXISTING PROVISIONS AND POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO LIGHTING WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO CRIME AT THE HILLDROP AREA, ISLINGTON.

The existing lighting situation is extremely inconsistent. On some parts of the estate the lighting is better than might be expected but in other places, usually with older lighting, the situation is woefully bad. In these areas, what lighting there is, is very probably an encouragement to anti-social and general criminal behaviour rather than an aid to crime prevention.

With such a mixed bag of: High-intensity sodium lamps, low pressure sodium, mercury halides, fluorescent, polycarbonate globes etc. it is difficult to make any general sweeping statement about the lamping. But perhaps the estate falls roughly into three groups.

1. At the back of some of the blocks is where the lighting is at it's best. Lighting levels here are often good but the placing of the lamps is quite bad. Simply increasing brightness does not in itself provide good solutions. In fact it can make matters worse. By throwing bright light on to objects you can increase the density of shadows created. A high but even lux level should be the general aim.

2. The main thoroughfares are far worse. The columns are some of the earliest pre-cast concrete types and hideously ugly. The lighting here is totally traffic orientated and gives a colour rendition which makes the area appear sleazy and threatening. It is here that the conflict between trees and lighting is at it's worst. The area has a lot of very fine trees and every effort should be made to keep them as they are a great humanising factor. It should not be too difficult, with a bit of prudent pruning, to make a good compromise between keeping the trees and not allowing them to mask off and interfere with the lighting. In poorly lighted area moving shadows cast by trees can be very scaring for many people.
3. There are several areas which fall into a category of their own in that the lighting, or sometimes complete lack of it, makes them downright dangerous and very frightening. Prime amongst these is the area at the back of the school and around the church and some of the inter-spaces between buildings.

There is not much of architectural merit on the estate but the area is not without interest. Indeed both the school and the church mentioned above would be leading contenders for creating interest and adding some visual quality at night by being well lighted. This aspect of lighting, so often and so easily overlooked, plays a very real part in generating an interest, concern and a sense of well-being that leads to a collective confidence which in turn has an impact on crime reduction and prevention.

The relationship between crime and lighting is not a very well researched subject and although the subject is now creating a great deal of interest the application and understanding involved is far from complete. However, some useful work has been done in the U.S.A. and although a great many findings on say, the reduction crime rates, are not yet conclusive, one thread that runs clear throughout all the work done on the subject is that the public, police and those generally concerned with policing say without exception, that in areas where lighting is up-graded to good levels, there is a greater feeling of security and safety in general.

It is in this context that Hilldrop becomes very important in that it will be the first ever lighting crime survey carried out in the country and could produce results which would establish guidelines for all future work on lighting and crime.
Put simply, with the exceptions pointed out, the lighting intensities and levels throughout the estate are woefully inadequate. It is now being widely accepted that between no measurable lighting and 5 Lux levels 42% of all night-time street crime takes place and between 5 and 10 Lux a further 30%. There are few place in the area that achieve 5 lux and only one area where reading of 10 Lux and over can be measured. This therefore is a poor state of affairs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Housing Blocks

All front door areas should be lighted individually. Light fittings should be placed so that the light fall as square on to the visitors face as possible. Above the door would be ideal but if this is not possible then either side of the door would be satisfactory. Tungsten or white fluorescent lamps are best here as their colour rendering is far superior to most other forms of lighting. This colour rendition is most important as it help with recognition and crucial for people when having to open their front door at night.

In most cases the application of light fittings to front doors take care of balcony lighting. Where this is not so the use of Appleby fittings, now used widely throughout the borough would be very satisfactory.

General lighting around most of the blocks is extremely poor. Not only for their lighting levels but for the levels of distribution and again in most situations the colour rendition values are bad.

In these precinct areas Lux levels of 15 should be attempted after lamp settlement. High pressure sodium lamps are far better in crime deterrent than low pressure sodiums lamps.

Philips wallpack fittings are now being used a great deal throughout the borough and are ideal in that they throw a good and very pleasant light and being wall mounted are far less prone to vandalism. The use of polycarbonate spheres or globes is not recommended as these can causes great nuisance to upper floor bedrooms, produce a poor light level and are very wasteful. Philips for example have
in response to complaints, brought out a light-directed capped version of this column standing luminaire.

2. The Main Thoroughfares.
This is where in general terms, the lighting is at it's worst. In most places the street lighting is of such a poor standard it is difficult to take even the lowest of light reading levels.

Ideally the existing concrete columns need replacing with higher ones and the spacings between should be much reduced. For both traffic - pedestrian considerations the existing (usually low pressure) lamps should be replaced with High Pressure SON lamps both for good recognition and distribution levels. Lux levels should be brought up to a level of 5 Lux or over with 4 Lux minimum where ever possible.

3. The Church and School etc.
As stated before these areas are somewhat different to the two areas discussed above. Both the church and the school present problems in that they are extremely poorly lighted and potentially dangerous in terms of personal attack.

However both situations present a real opportunity not just for lighting installation as an impact against crime but also to enliven the area with interest. Particularly in the case of the church, specialised flood lighting could be installed as an enriching feature.

Roy Fleming FCSD
Lighting Design Consultant
Senior lecturer in design Middlesex Polytechnic
Associate of the Centre for Criminology

November 1987
HILLDROP ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

MAP No 1. Distribution of victimization incidents over the period 12 months to March/April 1967.

- = offences against property
= = offences against individuals
HILLDROP ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

Map No 2: Areas avoided due to fear of crime

= areas avoided by 5 - 10 per cent of residents
= areas avoided by 10 - 15 per cent of residents
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