



Victims and Victimization

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“A rose is a rose is a rose” (Stein 1922) is a profoundly unfortunate statement. (I have no idea what the poet meant by the phrase, except that the poem from which it is taken appears to be about human identity.) Translating it into “a Jew is a Jew is a Jew” or “a woman is a woman is a woman” makes its perniciousness clearer. Each individual rose is subtly unique in coloration, petal structure, fragrance, and the like. Each individual Jew is a person subtly unique in appearance, personality, and experience. All categorization, however necessary, diminishes those categorized. It evokes perceptions of within-category similarities and submersion of within-category differences, not least through the manipulation of the self-perception of those so categorized. The readiness with which categorization can be translated into hostility and conflict has been demonstrated in the classic studies of Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif, including their classic “Robber’s Cave” demonstration of the creation and removal of conflict (Sherif and Sherif 1956), by the work of Henri Tajfel (1982), repeatedly by other scholars, and movingly by William Shakespeare in *The Merchant of Venice*, with Shylock’s plea not to be regarded as a Jew, rather as a person: “I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food,



hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is?" Unidimensional categorization is perhaps especially insidious when the dimension involves gender, religion, or ethnicity. If a woman is seen as nothing but a woman, a Muslim nothing but a Muslim, and a person of color nothing but a person of color, the consequences are foreseeable and regrettable. The significance of our failures to make within-category distinctions lies at the core of much social psychology, not least psycholinguistics, wherein the inability to see or the tendency to discount within category distinctions underpins much of social cognition (Steinberg 1982). Individual differences in the tendency to tolerate within-category variation, the "tolerance of ambiguity," was central to the psychological investigations of Fascism after World War II (Adorno et al. 1951; Rokeach 1960). The failure to recognize within-category variation ("All Xs look the same to me") was linked specifically with anti-Semitism and more generally with fascist leanings. Impoverishment by categorization is greatest where the category has pejorative overtones.

18.1 Victim Status as Strait-Jacket

One kind of unidimensional categorization is as a victim. This is understandable because it defines the "script" for police officers attending an incident. Yet categorization as a victim is no less regrettable than others, although ostensibly more sympathetic to the person so categorized. It is itself perhaps a form of victimization, even when the victim seeks such an attribution by others or needs such an attribution to gain access to the resources of criminal justice. Victim is certainly a category with pejorative connotations. It is dignified (or further impoverished) by its own "-ology," victimology, as a subdiscipline of criminology, which focuses on a particular set of concerns. The existence of that discipline differentiates victims from more powerful actors in crime and justice. It is hardly an accident that there is no discipline known as judgeology, and that those branches of psychology that deal with the powerful have more allusive titles (occupational psychology, forensic psychology) than those that deal with the less powerful (child psychology, criminal psychology). In short, victimology, founded with the best of motives, outraged by the marginalized status of those suffering crime within the criminal justice process, turns out to be a mixed blessing for crime victims.

Recognizing that categorization as victim brings with it overtones of passivity and powerlessness, interest groups—particularly those concerned about offenses against women and the gendered associations of victimhood—have sought to replace the term with that of survivor. This form of

categorization also has its downside. First, the term remains essentially passive. Second, it has application to only some crime types. Used more generally, it invites ridicule. It sounds ridiculous to be said to have survived events that are not life-threatening or seriously traumatizing. For example, can people who have repeatedly suffered criminal damage, unpleasant as that is, be said to be survivors? Although the word *survivor* seems wrong, the informing spirit that gave rise to it is both understandable and laudable. It is poetically enshrined in Hamlet's most famous soliloquy in which he contemplates suicide and muses whether it is "nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing, end them."

The choice identified by Hamlet is central to the selection of a term appropriate to be applied to those who suffer harm through crime. The designation survivor is an attempt to move people from the first (suffering) to the second (opposing) but stops halfway, at enduring. The orientation towards one or other pole (suffering versus opposing) is one that the psychologist would couch in terms of locus of control. This is the expression used to describe how people vary in the extent to which they believe they can bend the world to their will (Ajzen 2002). Depression is seen to be linked to a primarily external locus of control. The attempt to redesignate the victim as survivor is in essence a linguistic attempt to move the locus of control of those suffering crime to become more internal. Survival is something one achieves by endurance; victimhood is something one passively suffers.

The nexus between victim status and locus of control is important enough to discuss a little more fully. A fictional but stunningly insightful presentation of that nexus is to be found in one of Saul Bellow's less well-regarded novels, *The Victim* (1947). In most contexts, internal locus of control (within the range dictate by realism) is valued. It leads to questioning of the unreasonable status quo and to innovation in problem-solving, and is perhaps the central characteristic of those who transform society. Criminal justice, the armed forces, and some religious forms are the obvious contexts in which internal locus of control is least valued. In the armed forces, orders must be obeyed without question, control of one's actions being temporarily given over to those in command. In authoritarian religious variants, deviation from prescribed action is sinful. In an analogous way, criminal law is by definition the area in which the regulation of relations between citizens is given over by the citizen to the state. In civil law, conflicts are played out with the state as adjudicator. The distinctiveness of criminal justice in this respect has led to the charge that criminal law involves the "theft" of conflicts between citizens (Christie 1977) and that the scope of the criminal law should therefore be as narrowly circumscribed as possible. The literature covering the variety of ways in which harms are dealt with in other cultures and at other



times is fascinating and dispels any notions of the inexorability of any route to resolution of those conflicts that Westerners are accustomed to think of in terms of criminal victimization.

18.2 The Political Attractions of the Passive and Fearful

There are some advantages to those set in authority for crime victims to be induced into a mind-set where there is external locus of control, just as there are advantages to be had for military and religious leaders to have compliant followers. External locus of control makes for passivity. Passivity is inimical to vigilantism (Morrissey and Pease 1982), vengeance, and protest. At the time of writing, prominent in the news is the murder in a Belfast bar of Robert McCartney, apparently by members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The murder was brutal and the aftermath callous, in that the bar was cleaned, CCTV tape removed, and threats issued to prevent the seventy or so people in the bar from reporting what they saw to the police. PIRA has had a long-standing policy (Morrissey and Pease 1982) of not cooperating with the official agencies of crime and justice in Northern Ireland (despite the radical reform of the police service, including a change of name from Royal Ulster Constabulary to Police Service of Northern Ireland, to make it acceptable to the nationalist community). PIRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, in its public pronouncements, has pointedly not enjoined those responsible for the McCartney murder to give themselves up to the police. In a bizarre twist, PIRA offered to shoot the murderers! The sisters and fiancée of the murdered man declined that warped substitute for due process (*Irish News* 2005; *Glasgow Herald* 2005).

The reason for dwelling at some length on the McCartney case is that it illustrates the *raison d'être* of the state interposing itself between a person needing redress and the perpetrators of crimes against them. In the West Belfast context, most of the people with guns belong to PIRA. The power balance between PIRA and the McCartney family is so heavily weighted in favor of the former that fairness could not prevail when one inflicts hurt on the other. If the stronger harms the weaker, the weaker is left without redress. If the weaker harms the stronger, a parodic unofficial version of justice is meted out. The McCartneys need a criminal justice system to take up the cudgels on their behalf. The Ulster situation illustrates what happens when that system is not generally perceived to be legitimate or relevant. Such situations are not uncommon, as the prevalence of blood feuds attests. We thus recognize a trade-off between, on the one hand, the desirability of people believing that their fate is in their own hands (making internal locus of control a good thing) and the fact that in an unfair world, people are often powerless against their persecutors, and need the state to intervene.¹



The McCartney case illustrates the dynamics of individual-community links particularly starkly because of the armed strength of the relevant paramilitary groups, but does have wider applicability, for example, to the power of gangs and extended families to impact upon victimized communities. A particularly insightful account of the defensive propaganda that paramilitary groups dispense, and the harrowing individual stories that underlie such propaganda, is provided by Kirwan Sarma (2003). In the testimony of the murdered Eamon Collins, the dimension of power as central is evident. The man soon to be murdered observed: “Threats, exile, car burnings, house burnings, mass intimidation of one man in a housing area where hundreds of families live. How can it be explained? How can it be justified? It is justified by stigmatizing, by stereotyping, by demonizing, by depersonalizing Victims elect have been demonized, the rest of the community anaesthetized Strip people of their status as mothers, fathers, brothers, children, and what you are left with is the non-person, and with it justification for arson, murder, expulsion. Will I suffer further violence?” (Sarma 2003: 206).

Sadly, despite his articulate and insightful declarations, he was killed, and his murderer never brought to trial. One fears that this will be an all-too-exact precursor of the McCartney *events*. Although state intervention via criminal justice is an unhappy necessity for individuals harmed by crime, as noted above, it can also serve the state’s interests as an opiate of the people for a secular age, limiting the extent to which people are minded to take matters into their own hands. The vested interest of the state in inducing an external locus of control in relation to citizen victimization by crime is more subtly illustrated in the pre-eminence of fear as the “official” emotion to be experienced in relation to crime victimization. Latterly, the politics of fear has emerged as an issue of massive interest and controversy, wherein social control and the curtailment of civil liberties are justified by the appeal to the purpose of public protection, currently stimulated by fears of terrorism. In the conclusion of a monumental cultural history of fear, we read: “Fear is manipulated by numerous organizations with a stake in creating fear while promising to eradicate it. Fear circulates within a wealthy economy of powerful interest groups dependent upon ensuring that we remain scared. Theologians, politicians, the media, physicians, and the psychological services depend on our fright. Despite the proliferation of discourses about fear, its eradication has never been seriously countenanced: substitution of fear-inspiring discourses, rather than its obliteration, has been the goal” (Bourke 2005: 385–386).

Looking at the holdings of the Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University in New Jersey, entering the keyword *fear* brings up 1,954 refer-

¹ By extension, it also reflects the need for international law and an international justice process for circumstances where the nation state is itself the persecutor.

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ences. Entering the keyword *anger* brings up a mere 469. Little would one know from this imbalance that anger is more often expressed as the emotion experienced by crime victims, and by other citizens, than fear (Ditton et al. 1999).

The major planks of the victim movement cast the victim as essentially passive. The charity formed to aid victims came to be known as 'Victim Support'. This has overtones of victim tendency to wilt which the alternative expression 'victim help' does not. ... Fear is a seemly reaction by the passive. Anger is not. Anger is inconsistent with the victim role. Why do we prefer to characterize those who suffer crime as passive? It is expedient so to do. The passive accept gratefully such support as is given and such compensation as the state is prepared, however tardily, to provide. The angry victim is liable to vigilantism, informal punishments of the locally troublesome, and is likely to get uppity in the face of the inefficiencies and absurdities of the criminal justice process. The fearful victim is mercifully compliant. Angry victims are the ultimate silent majority, those whose reaction is not documented or attended to in policy. It is difficult to overstate the consequences of the lack of attention given to the angry victim, and the celebration of the fearful crime victim. It is time to redress the balance (Ditton et al. 1999: 52).

Victim emotional response is complex. Crime is associated not with a specific symptom profile but rather with a pervasive elevation of symptoms across domains. The emotional impact of crime varies with pre-existing personal characteristics and with *perceived* more-than-official support after the victimization (Norris, Kaniasty, and Thompson 1997; Shaw 2001).

The relation between fear and external locus of control is a close one. Joanna Bourke's cultural history of fear detailed how the sense of being able to do something to change a situation diminishes fear (2005). She noted, for example, how fighter pilots experienced less fear than bomber crews, and how anti-aircraft batteries were allowed to keep firing even when their targets had moved out of range, in the recognition that to do so would reduce anxiety.

Whether male or female, officer or private, the fear engendered by modern warfare was less likely to be linked to the multiple threats to survival than to the crippling anxiety arising out of the stripping away of individual agency. Increasingly, coping with fear





on the battlefield was linked to the ability of combatants to strike out and kill the enemy (Bourke 2005: 208).

18.3 Locus of Control, Victim Blame, and Realism

Bourke wrote at length about the role of fear of sexual assault in gender relations and, in the same vein, emphasizing the importance for peace of mind of fostering internal locus of control. However, there is a complication here. How does one foster internal locus of control without engaging in victim blame? Some categories of victim are already prone to blame themselves for what happened to them, victims of sexual assault being one poignant category of self-blamer. How can one square a healthy movement towards internal locus of control with the avoidance of victim blame? Does not the internal locus of control suggest that avoidance of victimization was in one's own power, implying that the offense *was* at least in part the victim's fault? Certainly many victims see it this way. Some 10.2 percent of victims responding to the 1996 British Crime Survey answered in the affirmative to the question: "Apart from the offenders, would you say you or anyone else were responsible in any way for what happened, because of something you did or forgot to do?" Three-quarters of those answering yes blamed themselves; 13 percent of those blaming themselves said they had provoked the offender. The proportion of victims of violence and sexual crime saying they had "provoked the offender" was around 8 percent. To eliminate victim self-blame would appear to constitute a considerable enterprise.

Victim blame is a corrosive and common phenomenon. In a meta-analysis (Whatley 1996) of forty-nine experimental studies conducted between 1973 and 1995, the degree of responsibility assigned by third-party observers to female rape victims varied with

- The revealingness of the victim's clothing
- Victim personality
- Acquaintance with the attacker

The apparent continued salience of extralegal factors in blame attribution in rape cases is evident in even the most recent research (Finch and Munro 2005). Victims of sexual assault who sought help from formal support services were commonly faced with victim blame, stigmatization, and the controlling reactions of others (Filipas and Ullman 2001). Perhaps a clue is to be gleaned from their linkage of victim blame with the controlling reactions of others (the opposite of internal locus of control). As Rebecca and Russell Dobash opined in respect of domestic violence: "The idea of provocation ...

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is both naïve and insidious the idea of provocation is a very powerful tool used in justifying the husband's dominance and control" (1979: 168).

The uncomfortable (or liberating) reality is that in many cases, had crime victims behaved differently, their victimization would not have occurred. In many circumstances and contexts, it is outrageous to suggest that any disapproval should attach to their choices or they should have behaved otherwise than they did. People should wear what they feel happy in. They should not be required to submit in domestic arguments to avoid being assaulted. On the other hand, leaving the keys in a vehicle ignition is an action that may be later regretted, where that degree of self-blame is not a major threat to mental well-being. Attribution theory may, it is controversially claimed, help to clarify victim self-blame in the clinical and research literature on child sexual abuse (Dalenberg and Jacobs 1994). Other-blame is often presented as the preferable attributional outcome for abuse victims, while the empirical evidence is held by the writers concerned to be less than supportive of this claim. Important differences in definition of self- and other-blame across studies are noted, and it is suggested that further research examine the attributions more broadly, assess their accuracy, and allow for the possibility of evaluating interactional hypotheses. This is a brave argument, not least because the researchers concerned chose the most emotive form of victimization, child sexual abuse, on which to focus.

Essentially the same argument is cast more widely, and expressed less provocatively, by others (Davis, Taylor, and Titus 1997), who consider that victims can be regarded as "agents" in their own victimization in three ways: by enduring personal characteristics that make them an attractive target, by virtue of the choices they make about places and company they choose, and by how they respond to the behavior of would-be perpetrators. Yet others go further by referring to the victim role in personal fraud in terms of cooperation and concluding that some victims exhibit "considerable cooperation" (Titus and Gover 2001), of types that can be paraphrased as follows:

- The victim either makes or facilitates the initial contact with the offender.
- The victim provides information about him- or herself that aids offenders in the crime.
- The victim allows the offender to convert what should be a business relationship into a personal relationship.
- The victim allows the offender to create a version of events that, when believed, enables fraud.
- The victim writes checks or gives personal details that enable the offender to access victim funds.

These elements have particular resonance in the years since they were written in reflecting common elements in fraud via the Internet.

One answer to the charge of colluding in victim blame is as follows:

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“Surprisingly, rather than leading to denigration of victims, the view of the victim as an integral part of criminal incidents is proving to have significant benefits for victims. By understanding how their behavior or characteristics make them vulnerable, people can begin to shift the odds more in their favor” (Davis, Taylor, and Titus 1997: 169).

In the foregoing part of the chapter, the downside of categorization as crime victim was discussed at length. It masks differences among the experiences of those who suffer crime, it has overtones of passivity, and it invites simplistic notions of the interactions between perpetrators and victims. Nonetheless, the term *crime victim*, with some diffidence, has to be accepted as reflecting both common usage and the reality of the currently passive role which the crime victim typically occupies. The rationale for the content and structure of the remainder of this chapter is, however, that any crime event should trigger a process in which the victim is active, both in preventing the recurrence of crime against the self, intimates, colleagues, neighbors, or unknown others, and as an actor in the forums of criminal justice. Both because the victim will usually have the opportunity to be involved in the first, and only rarely to be involved in the second, the emphasis will be placed on the first. This will give the chapter a different focus from that usually given to reviews of the victim literature (Zender 2002).

18.4 The Concentration of Victimization

Perhaps the most striking fact about crime victimization is how unevenly it is distributed across the “eligible” population. This will not be surprising to those with experience of schools, dysfunctional families, or abusive relationships where assault, verbal bullying, and intimidation are focused upon the same individual, often remorselessly. Looking beyond these well-understood special (and massively important) cases to volume crime generally, it is the case that in industrialized countries, crime victimization surveys find an average of 40 percent of crimes to have been committed against individuals and households are repeats against targets already victimized that year (Farrell and Bouloukos 2001). In one year:

- 16 percent of the U.K. population experience property crime but 2 percent of the population experience 41 percent of property crime.
- 8 percent of the U.K. population experience personal crime, but 1 percent of the population experience 59 percent of personal crime (Pease 1998).



With variation by crime type, time, and place, repeat victimization contributed disproportionately to all types of crimes adequately studied to date. A study by Soumyo Moitra and Suresh Konda, investigating network attacks on computer systems, demonstrated extensive repeat victimization (2004). The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) showed that:

- Patterns of repeat victimization are remarkably similar in the seventeen Western industrialized countries that were studied.
- Repeated sexual incidents against women are typically the crimes most likely to be repeated, with close to half of all incidents being repeats against the same women.
- Rates of repeat personal crimes were generally higher than those of repeat property crime. Rates of repeat “assault and theft” and robbery were particularly high.
- The ICVS findings on repeat victimization are remarkably consistent for survey sweeps covering more than a decade.

From the mid-1990s, there was a substantial increase in the number of studies examining repeat victimization. By the start of 2005, they numbered in the hundreds and documented the extent of repeat victimization for various crime types, using various methods and in many countries and contexts. It is clear from personal and vicarious experience, even if it were not intuitively obvious, that concentrated victimization is a feature of domestic violence, racial attacks, and bullying. However, concentration has been demonstrated for many types of crime and disorder. Property crimes include:

- Bank robbery
- Commercial burglary
- Computer network hacking
- Computer theft
- Credit card fraud
- Criminal damage and vandalism
- Fraud and other white-collar crimes
- Graffiti
- Property crime against schools
- Residential burglary
- Shoplifting
- Theft of and from vehicles
- Computer network attacks

Personal or violent crimes and disorder where extensive repeat victimization has been shown to date include:





- Common assault
- Domestic violence
- Elder abuse
- Neighbor disputes
- Robbery of shops and stores (commercial)
- Sexual victimization (including rape and other physical, verbal, and visual sexual victimizations)
- Serious assault
- Stalking
- Child abuse (physical, sexual, and emotional, including neglect as a repeated or ongoing crime of omission)
- Street robbery (including muggings, stick-ups, robbery at cash machines)
- Threats of violence (Farrell 2005b)

The list of crime types above is not exhaustive, but demonstrates some crime types where the prevention of repetition involves the prevention of all offending of the type. When contrasted with current evaluated practices discussed further below, it quickly becomes apparent that efforts to prevent repeat victimization are in their infancy. The theme underpinning this chapter is that the prevention of further offenses against the same and related targets is the best service that can be afforded to a crime victim, and that the involvement of the victim in that process is empowering. With this orientation, the crime event should be the starting point for remedial action, not a process of wrapping up an event by desultory police attendance and recording. Relatively few crime types have been tackled by prevention efforts (and when they have, they have seldom been evaluated, still less often adequately), but enough evidence exists that repetition can be reduced by postcrime action. If that were not the case, then internal locus of control is a myth and a delusion.

The significance of repeat victimization becomes ever clearer in relation to new and different types of crime as they come to be studied. Facts about repeat victimization other than the most obvious one, its apparent ubiquity, make it a good starting point of an attractive strategy for change in both individual and **a real** crime risk, the detection of prolific offenders and victim empowerment. These include the following:

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- Second and subsequent victimizations against the same targets tend to occur quickly after the preceding one. The pattern is consistent across crime types, including those like bank robbery, where this is counterintuitive (Matthews, Pease, and Pease 2001).
- Rates of repeat victimization are disproportionately higher in high-crime areas for the relevant types of property and personal crime,

suggesting that crime-proneness is intimately linked to concentration at the individual household level.

- Repeat victimization often underlies, or disproportionately contributes to, geographical hot spots of crime.
- The same offenders are more likely to commit repeat victimization (after learning that a target is suitable for further crime). This means that the prevention of repeat victimization meshes with the detection of repeat offenders.
- The rate of repeat victimization varies by crime type and context, but high rates are typically found for personal crimes including domestic violence, sexual victimization, racial attacks, bullying, shoplifting, and assaults and threats.
- Among property crimes, high rates of repeat victimization are often found in crimes against businesses including commercial burglary, robbery, and shop theft.
- Rates of repeat victimization are generally higher for personal crime than property crime.
- When a house is burgled, nearby neighbors experience a heightened risk. The risk declines with time and distance from the crime site. This is crucially important in that the individual crime event provides an opportunity for action that extends beyond the individual crime victim.

The last point speaks to an issue not addressed in this chapter, but which must be alluded to, namely the notion of vicarious and secondary victimization. The effects of a crime event are not limited to those directly suffering it. They extend to those distressed by dealing with it or hearing about it (and the more intrinsically distressing a crime, the more people will get to hear about it), those who will have to pay for its consequence (through taxation payment for emergency and court services, and elevated insurance premiums), and opportunities forgone by having to make those payments. Discussions of secondary and vicarious victimization are available (Shichor 1989; Schneider 2001; Kenney 2002; Orth 2002). The reason for not going down this route in this chapter is that the least contentious means of addressing secondary and vicarious victimization is by reducing primary victimization. Trying to limit secondary victimization per se will be possible only by the manipulation of emergency and court services to primary victims, or by limiting media freedoms to report.

For the same reasons, the writer is hostile to fear-reduction programs. The emphasis will remain on direct victimization. That said, there is a wider political and cultural agenda to which secondary victimization is central. Seeking to change (for example) gender relations so that victims of sexual offenses do not suffer humiliation on the basis of rape myths is valuable in



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its own right. The role of anticipated victimization by terrorist crime, induced by governments for the purpose of social control, is one of the fundamental motifs of political debate in the early twentieth century. The position of crime victims, the designated topic of this chapter, is important. However, the way in which the threat of victimization by organized others is coming to hold citizens in thrall, and justify enhanced state powers, is fundamental.

All of the points made above about the concentration of direct victimization can inform decisions about where, when, and how to allocate crime prevention resources, and crucially how to foster internal locus of control among crime victims, whether individuals or communities. Attempting to use the crime event as a stimulus to action is the central informing principle. Several projects aiming to prevent repeat victimization have been evaluated. Some have proven more effective than others. Practical lessons have been learned. Of particular importance are those lessons relating to implementation. These include the following:

- Even if it is clear where and when preventive resources should be put in place, developing preventive tactics can still be difficult for many types of crime.
- Where well-trying prevention tactics exist, victims can be difficult to contact, and many do not want or have the means to adopt preventive measures. Reasons for this include alienation from the police and the power of insurance to leave those who have had property stolen in a materially better position than before.

It currently seems unarguable that the best predictor of crime victimization is crime victimization. If that is so, the task is of mobilizing victim motivation to prevent repetition, often in the face of severe obstacles. This would be aided by an understanding of why repeats occur. There are two general classes of explanation, referred to as event dependence and risk heterogeneity in the criminological literature, and colloquially (and here) as flag and boost accounts, respectively.

Flag accounts imply that targets have stable chances of victimization attributable to their enduring characteristics. To take an obvious example, the World Trade Center was repeatedly victimized because it was talismanic of U.S. economic power, as was the Pentagon (which remains a symbol of U.S. military power). On a more mundane level, fuel filling stations will reliably hold nontrivial amounts of cash and tobacco, and jewelers of jewelry. These stable attributes make and maintain them as attractive crime targets. *Boost* accounts contend that circumstances of a first attempt make repetition more likely, be it shocked passivity by the victim of domestic violence, fuller awareness of vulnerability, or knowledge that stolen goods will be replaced by more



valuable new goods. Boring and obvious as the conclusion might seem, all but one of the relevant research studies suggest that both boost and flag accounts contribute materially to the phenomena of repeat victimization (Lauritsen and Davis-Quinet 1995; Osborn and Tseloni 1998; Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta 2000; Tseloni and Pease 2003). These more conventional quantitative analyses are bedeviled by the fact that one cannot measure everything about a person or place, so that “unmeasured heterogeneity,” that is, the existence of enduring differences that haven’t been measured, makes conclusions difficult. Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that boost accounts cannot be overlooked comes from interviews with offenders (Ashton et al. 1998). The “slipperiness” of hot spots shown by the work of Shane Johnson and Kate Bowers (2004; discussed below) also argues for boost effects.

To rehearse the evidence, we know that crime is concentrated on particular victims, and that crime risk moves out from those already victimized to those living nearby or sharing attributes that make them vulnerable. We can be confident that the reason for this comprises both enduring differences (flags) and experience gained by offenders making similar actions likely (boost). All these things should be incorporated in prudent victim help and empowerment. The unit of count, that is, what is a victim, arguably should be that which works best to promote crime prevention. So, whether repeats are counted as occurring against, say, the owner or the vehicle (if it changes ownership) or the household or its occupants (if they relocate) should be determined by what best serves prevention of future crime.

Lest this sound vague, an example may be taken from an interview with a versatile burglar (Ashton et al. 1998). One of his activities was the burglary of gas stations. He noticed that one supplier, with outlets across the United Kingdom, had standard floor layouts and security features across the country. Thus wherever he found himself, he could find somewhere to burgle that was familiar to him, familiarity being the central attraction to the offender of repetition against the same target. Such events have come to be known as virtual repeats, that is, instances where targets are selected because offenders have already offended against similar or identical targets. For example, the same make and model of car offers similar prospects to offenders whatever the particular lump of metal to which it refers. If the car is parked in a similar location or situation, the virtual-repeat is all the more identical. Households with the same layout are prone to virtual repeats because, for the offender, there is a good chance that the same type of effort and skills are needed, and the risks and rewards are similar to those of the previous target. The four planes downed by terrorist action in the United States on September 11, 2001, are perhaps the most dramatic possible instance of virtual repeats. These virtual-repeats provide a useful angle for thinking about how one thinks about the crime victim, and what kinds of collaboration between





victims and actions by the police on their behalf are most likely to result in reduced crime.

As noted earlier, the theme of this chapter is the involvement of victim agency after the crime event to mobilize action. Because some repeat crimes against the same person or household are different, and because, at least as far as burglary is concerned (and probably in respect of other offenses), risk “leaks” to nearby times and places, generating crime **spates**, meaning that crime reductive action should extend beyond the immediate victim. The term “near-repeat” was coined (obviously) to refer to the victimization of spatially and temporally close targets (Townesley, Homel, and Chaseling 2003; Johnson and Bowers 2004; Johnson, Bowers, and Pease 2004; Bowers, Johnson, and Pease 2004). The increased risk declines with distance from the initial target. Burglaries are “infectious”; that is, they can spread like a disease across an area, and interestingly their statistical analysis came from epidemiology. Infectious risk is greatest in areas with uniformly similar housing type and layout, with higher repeat rates in areas of more diverse housing type. The likely explanation is that many offenders prefer easy pickings, that is, more familiar targets where they have better knowledge of likely risk, effort, and rewards. Where housing type varies, the safe option is to go back to the home already burgled. Where one house is much like another, nearby homes are virtual repeats in the sense set out above. Shane Johnson and Kate Bowers (2004) invoked the ecological concept of the optimal forager, whereby just as (for example) a grazing animal minimizes effort while maximizing nutrition, so a burglar maximizes profit in relation to effort.

AU: Is this the same as “crime spree”?

If the hand that helps is indeed holier than the voice that sympathizes, the existence of crime spates affords the prospect of help beyond the immediate victim to others at elevated risk. Although the same basic patterns are being established in relation to other crime types, the evidence and its implications are furthest advanced with respect to domestic burglary, and it is that work which will be discussed below. The key insight is that, whereas some areas have enduringly higher rates of crime than others, hot spots are surprisingly slippery, with crime spates meaning that deployment of resources according to rates of crime measured over long periods of time is going to be suboptimal when one looks at the immediate future (any immediate future). The smart way of thinking about this is to decide how events of the past are best combined to predict the future. Johnson and **Bowers**, thinking along these lines, have developed “prospective hot spotting,” which utilizes near-repeats as the trigger for area-based preventive interventions. They demonstrated that “the risk of burglary is communicable, with properties within 400 meters of a burgled household being at a significantly elevated risk of victimization for up to two months after an initial event” (Johnson, Bowers, and Pease 2004: 641).

AU: Not “Johnson, Bowers, and Pease”?



Prospective hot spotting can substantially increase the predictability of future crime compared to traditional hot spotting. In the popular press, the comparison was made between these crime analysis efforts and the futuristic prediction/prevention effort of a Hollywood blockbuster: “Every police force in the country has been ordered to develop hi-tech crime maps—as seen in the sci-fi blockbuster film *Minority Report*—to predict future offending In *Minority Report*, starring Tom Cruise, criminals are caught before the crimes they commit” (Roberts 2005).

Prospective hot spotting presents fewer ethical problems than its fictional counterpart and is consistent with the emphasis on the quest for internal locus of control among those victimized. Kate Bowers and Shane Johnson are currently examining the *modus operandi* of near-repeats to find similarities, suggesting they are committed by the same offenders.

Apart from obvious advantages of concentrating on those already victimized set out above, there are others, both tactical and principled. The first is equity. Western European countries in particular seek to limit the degree of misery that their citizens should endure by way of illness and poverty by providing a safety net of health care and welfare benefits. If the distribution of misery through crime victimization is likewise skewed, similar safety net logic should arguably prevail. Indeed, the historical separation of crime prevention and victim support can be seen to represent a notable failure to distribute help equitably (Farrell and Pease 1997).

Apart from reasons of principle, the prevention of repeats and near-repeats has tactical advantages. These include the following (Farrell 2001, 2005b):

- Preventing repeat victimization is apparently less likely to result in displacement than unfocused crime prevention efforts.
- Preventing repeat victimization is a form of “drip feeding” of prevention resources. Because all crime does not occur at once, police resources need only be allocated as victimizations occur from day to day.
- Preventing repeat victimization presents possibilities for preventing and detecting organized crime and terrorism that focuses on vulnerable and rewarding victims and targets—including protection rackets, forced prostitution, loan-sharking, repeat trafficking via certain low-risk locations, art and other high-value thefts and robberies, and terrorist bombings.
- Preventing repeat victimization can generate common goals and positive work between police and other agencies (such as housing, social services, and victim organizations), which may in turn facilitate broader cooperation.




- Focusing on repeat victimization empowers police officers to do something tangible and constructive to help crime victims and for policing to become more generally oriented towards victims, who are arguably its core consumers.
- Preventing repeat victimization is triggered by a crime being reported. Because victims can be asked about prior victimizations, a response does not necessarily require data analysis.

A review of evaluated efforts to prevent repeat residential burglary produced findings that are likely to apply to other types of crime (Farrell 2005b). The details of the review will not be given here. The evaluated projects were not all successful in reducing crime. Depending on how a “project evaluation” is defined, between half and two-thirds of the projects were assessed to have prevented burglary. Graham Farrell (2005b) carefully drew out the lessons to be learned. To paraphrase, he concluded that what works to prevent repeat victimization is the following:

1. *A strong preventive mechanism.* Specific prevention tactics need to be tailored to the context and household because the nature of residential burglary varies from one place to the next.
2. *Multiple tactics.* The currently available evidence suggests multiple tactics working together can produce a synergistic effect. Although there is little conclusive evidence regarding the effectiveness of particular tactics, opportunity-blocking security aimed at preventing repeat residential burglary by the same *modus operandi* seems the most likely candidate for effectiveness.
3. *Strong implementation.* Some prevention efforts failed because the preventive mechanism was not introduced.
4. *A focus on high-crime- and high-burglary-rate situations.* Those times and places where rates of repeat burglary rates are highest are the most appropriate focus for prevention efforts.

Although in most work, the prevention effort has centered on domestic burglary, efforts in which repeat victimization concepts have been central deal with commercial burglary (Tilley 1993; Taylor 1999; Bowers 2001), domestic violence (Farrell and Buckley 1999; Hanmer, Griffiths, and Jerwood 1999), family violence (Davis and Taylor 1997), elder abuse (Davis and Medina-Ariza 2001), and sexual victimization (Breitenbecher, Hanson, and Gidycz 1998). In some other work, the prevention of repeats has formed one element among others, or the tactic of preventing repeats is presented in other terms. For example, seeking to prevent domestic violence by arresting the perpetrator is essentially a single-tactic approach to the prevention





of repetition (Sherman and Berk 1984; Sherman 1992). Because it is a single-tactic approach, it would be regarded by Graham Farrell as unlikely to succeed.²

There are a number of conditions that seem necessary for a successful (and successfully evaluated) enterprise seeking to reduce crime through the prevention of repeat attacks against the same target. These include the following:

- *The availability of defensible measures of repeat victimization:* Current police systems and practice do not always accurately represent the extent of repeat victimization. Paradoxically, during projects to reduce repeats, repetition comes to be salient to practitioners, leading them to record such events more assiduously, and leading to an illusory increase in the extent of repeat victimization. Where repeat victimization is poorly measured or increasingly well measured over the course of a project, an evaluation will not be precise enough to detect change. Some successful prevention efforts go without recognition because of measurement error. Victimization surveys are more likely to elicit more accurate measures of repeat victimization than recorded crime data and should be the measurement tool of choice where feasible. They are too expensive to be routine.³
- *A repertoire of tactics commensurate with the problem:* The existing repertoire to prevent many types of personal crime appears relatively limited relative to property crime and in particular burglary.
- *Implementation:* Antipathy to the police, antipathy of the police to victim-focused prevention, lack of coordination between preventing agencies, lack of resources to take preventive action, feelings of impotence, lack of clarity in what preventive action to take, and insurance-driven indifference to loss may all contribute to implementation failure. Given that many well-organized people and households will take preventive action without any external inducement, the burden of repeat victimization will disproportionately fall on the most vul-

² The reader impatient with the emphasis on repeat victimization and its prevention is referred to Farrell and Buckley (1999) for the clearest possible demonstration of the centrality of concentration of victimization to both the practice and evaluation of domestic violence reduction. To oversimplify, they demonstrated that a successful initiative involved no change in the number of calls for service, but an increase in first-time callers and a reduction of repeat callers, as word of the quality of the service got round, inducing victims who had hitherto not sought help to begin to do so.

³ A particularly important instance of the measurement problem is manifest in the U.S. National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). The NCVS systematically undercounts repeat victimization, with the result that the national crime rate in the United States is significantly misrepresented.



nerable. A survey of U.K. police forces in 2000 found that, although all of them had written policies to prevent repeat victimization, there was relatively little evidence of thorough implementation of prevention efforts. Some crime prevention officers who responded to the survey appeared unable to distinguish tactics to prevent repeat victimization from more general crime prevention tactics (Farrell et al. 2000). One little-documented problem concerns police attitudes, which sometimes tend to label residents of areas as generally undeserving, so that victimization of residents of particular areas is a matter for wry humor rather than sympathy. Further, in many projects, officers are reluctant to extend the same support to those believed to be active criminals as to others.

- *Sustainability*: Many crime prevention evaluations or development projects receive funding from local or central government. The funding is typically for a fixed period of time in which the crime prevention effort is developed, implemented, and evaluated. The usual scenario is that funding then ceases, which, in turn, means that prevention efforts cease. More subtly, a crime reduction program has a champion (for example, a local police chief) whose movement onwards and upwards makes way for a replacement, usually strong-minded, who wants to implement his or her own cherished initiatives. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for sustainability is the perception of the crime event as the starting point for coordinated action rather than (after the necessary paperwork is completed) the end-point of action. This involves a fundamental reorientation of traditional conceptions of policing.

Crime control and victim support policy and strategies are beginning to reflect the concentration of crime however considered—hot spots, prolific offenders, repeat victims, and “hot” products. Repeat offenders are the target of focused detection, special sentencing considerations, in-prison behavioral and other treatments regimes, and intensive probationary supervision. Hot products are gradually achieving attention from product designers as well as from legislators who realize that crime-free product design may pre-empt much crime. Hot spots draw police and other resources. The repeatedly victimized receive postvictimization advice and assistance. Which of these various strategies is the most cost-effective is probably not a question that should be asked, because the appropriate strategy should involve them all. Just as drug cocktails are often more effective than individual treatments, so multiple-stranded interventions may be preferable in the prevention of repeat crime. Certainly it would be bizarre if criminogenic products and services proliferated alongside programs to target the detection of the prolific





offender. Specific strategies or combinations of strategies will be more appropriate at particular times and locations, and must evolve and adapt to meet the constantly changing shape of crime.

18.5 The Victim and Criminal Justice

Although the bulk of this chapter has been given over to victims attempting to secure the prevention of repeat crime against the same target, some crimes are detected, so a modest account of victim involvement postdetection is necessary. When a perpetrator is found, what role should the victim play in the criminal justice process? One strand, the compensation of victims for harm caused, is now in principle uncontentious though complex in application. The second deals with the incorporation of victim concerns in the enforcement of law and administration of justice. The literature shows how services for crime victims have developed over the last three decades (Kelly and Erez 1997; Lurgio, Skogan, and Davis 1990ed), and how much of that can be credited to unfunded grassroots movements concerned primarily with violence against women (Friedman and Tucker 1997). There remains much cause for unease about the experiences that victims continue to have, although matters have improved. The failure to notify victims of the progress of cases (even when there is no progress to report), their vulnerability to witness intimidation, the failure to separate victims from other witnesses (including defense witnesses) in court waiting arrangements, the presumption that witness time is not valuable and that victims' lives can be reorganized at short notice to give priority to court requirements (and frequent lengthy waits when the court's needs are accommodated), the paucity of support services for victims, their preparation for the hostile questioning that is part of an adversarial process, the feelings of hurt and rejection that follow an acquittal (with the implicit suggestion that the victim was lying), or a sentence that seems derisory and makes the victim vulnerable to repeats through the imminent freedom of the perpetrator. Even the language is often insensitive. In England and Wales, cases may be discontinued by the Crown Prosecution Service for two primary reasons—evidentiary insufficiency and “in the interests of justice.” For victims willing to testify, the first reason is demeaning. The second is tantamount to saying that the victim's experience did not matter enough for the state to become involved.

AU: To fix the sentence frag that follows, perhaps reword this as “Although matters have improved, there remains much cause for unease about the experiences that victims continue to have: the

In the court setting, the victim impact statement (VIS) is the most usual form in which victim involvement is secured, with victim-offender reconciliation programs and their close relation restorative justice also having their champions. The most obvious reason for some involvement is that of fairness, which may be thought to require that injured parties should have a voice



(Sumner 1987), and that if they do not, the state has stolen their conflict. The realities of criminal justice process mean that such involvement comes at a price. These include the following:

- Variable victim involvement and variable verbal facility among victims introduce a source of unwarranted variation in sentencing (Grabosky 1987).
- Legal precept is that unforeseen consequences should not play a part in sentencing. If victim impact statements to the court reveal personal vulnerabilities (for example, a thin skull or hemophilia) that make the consequences of assault more severe, unfairness to the defendant follows (Ashworth 1993).
- Victim involvement creates expectations that, if unrealized, would amount to secondary victimization. If the court, having heard a victim account, proceeds to a sentence that seems lenient, the victim will feel that the court has placed a low price on his or her distress (Fattah 1986).

For some, the compensation for hurt, and the humane treatment of victims, does not exhaust the victim agenda. The recasting of justice as restorative, or in terms of reintegrative shaming, has latterly been in vogue (Braithwaite 1989, 1999; Umbreit 2001). Taking much of its inspiration from practices among the indigenous peoples of Australasia, it sits uneasily with a criminal justice system that is focused upon culpability as well as harm. Put oversimply, in the writer's view there is more in the practice of restorative justice for the perpetrator than for the victim, and the dangers of railroading well-intentioned and kindly victims into a process that is primarily for the benefit of the offender may, particularly in unskilled hands, become a form of secondary victimization. The empirical research on the topic shows mixed results, with strong stories of reconciliation in short supply (Daly 2002).

AU: Other chapters call this section "Conclusions"; change to match them?

18.6 Endnote

In brief, the argument of this chapter has been that stimulating into existence a realistic degree of internal locus of control among victims should be at the core of victim programs. This should be focused upon the prevention of repeated crimes against the prior victim or those linked to that victim by location or vulnerability. This emphasis requires a diminution of stress on the avoidance of victim blame. Victims sometimes recognize their contribution to crime events, and it serves internal locus of control that this should be so in certain circumstances (and emphatically not in others). The progress

towards practical victim help and support in a criminal justice environment that is largely hostile to them must continue. The involvement of victims in schemes of restorative justice will require more and more persuasive evidence of benefit to be safely advocated.

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